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Introduction 
On April 21st, 2011, Khayrat al-Shatir, an influential leader in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, 
gave a lecture to a large following in Alexandria, named, “Features of Nahda: Gains of the 
Revolution and the Horizons for Developing”.1 Two months earlier, Egypt had witnessed the 
extraordinary resignation of President Hosni Mubarak from his position. In the lecture, al-
Shatir elaborated on the “Mashru’ al-Nahda”, or “the Renaissance Project”. After decades of 
repression from army-appointed presidents, the Muslim Brotherhood saw its chance to 
revive itself in public and play an important role in determining the political course of Egypt. 
The Nahda Project, al-Shatir stressed, was the plan to establish an Islamic government in 
Egypt, followed by a global Islamic state, according to the guidelines of Hassan al-Banna’, 
the founding father of the Muslim Brotherhood.2 Al-Shatir thus made clear that the 
Brotherhood’s plans and commitment to an Islamic State remained completely unchanged 
since the Muslim Brotherhood’s inception. Furthermore, for this plan to work, the 
“structure” set up by the Brotherhood “needs to be obeyed and committed to,”3 emphasizing 
the authority of the movement’s leaders over its members.  
 Two and a half months earlier, with protests against Mubarak on-going, another 
Brotherhood leader, ‘Isam al-‘Aryan, published an op-ed in the New York Times called 
“What the Muslim Brothers Want”.4  Al-‘Aryan stated that the Brotherhood “is committed to 
joining the national effort toward reform and progress.” He goes on to say that  
 
“We come with no special agenda of our own — our agenda is that of the Egyptian 
people … We aim to achieve reform and rights for all: not just for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, not just for Muslims, but for all Egyptians … we envision the 
establishment of a democratic, civil state that draws on universal measures of 
freedom and justice, which are central Islamic values … The Muslim Brotherhood 
stands firmly behind the demands of the Egyptian people as a whole.5 
 
                                 
1 Hudson Institute, “Translation: Khairat al-Shater on the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood”, Current 
Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol 13 (2012), 128. 
2 Hudson Institute, “Translation: Khairat al-Shater”, 130.  
3 Ibid, 131. 
4 ‘Isam al-‘Aryan, “What the Muslim Brothers want”, The New York Times, February 9, 2011. 
5 al-‘Aryan, “What the Muslim Brothers want” 
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Here, al-‘Aryan presents the Brotherhood’s goals to be concurrent with the Egyptian people’s 
goals. Moreover, the Brotherhood’s vision for reform is presented as simply on par with 
liberal, democratic values.  
 The differences in content between the two texts raise glaring questions about the 
Brotherhood’s intentions for political reform in Egypt. Is an Islamic state simply compatible 
with a liberal democratic system? And how does the “obedience and commitment” of the 
Nahda speech relate to “universal measures of freedom and justice”? Al-Shatir may have 
said to simply want to follow al-Banna’s guidelines, but al-Banna’ did not envision at all the 
democratic state al-‘Aryan presented in his op-ed. Indeed, part of the Islamist project was to 
break down Western secularism and the structures of state that European countries 
introduced in Egypt. In stark contrast, by the spring of 2012, the Muslim Brothers were 
running for the top position of the Egyptian government, something they had until shortly 
before denied they would aim for.6 If the Muslim Brothers anno 2011 saw their ultimate goal 
as creating an Islamic state, what were the Brothers planning to do as rulers within the 
secular national framework of the Arab Republic of Egypt? 
The apparent contradictions in the Brotherhood’s discursive practices have led some 
commentators to believe that the Muslim Brothers can simply not be trusted. All their talking 
about democracy and freedom, they argue, is designed to hide their real desire of “building 
an Islamic State”7 or even a “theocracy”.8 However, these commentators presuppose that 
Islamism and liberal democracy are by definition two polarized, mutually exclusive 
concepts. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood has been quick to equate their Islamist 
ideals with democratic values, presenting an opposite presupposition.9 
In my opinion, such assertions gloss over the huge complexity and variety of 
elements that have shaped Muslim Brotherhood ideology and discourse over the decades. 
Therefore, I contend that in order to understand the Muslim Brotherhood’s discourse in the 
                                 
6 al-‘Aryan, “What the Muslim Brothers want” 
7 Samuel Tadros, “What is a Constitution Anyway?”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 14 
(2013), 9 
8 Trager, Eric, “Egypt’s Looming Competitive Theocracy”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 
14 (2013), 27-28, Trager, Eric, “The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a 
Liberal Egypt,” Foreign Affairs, 90 (2011), 114-126. 
9 See for example, Al-Shatir, no need to be afraid of us, Abu al-Futuh, “Democracy Supporters should 
not fear the MB” 
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post-Mubarak era, one must first dig up its historical foundations. This Master’s thesis 
attempts to analyse the discourse employed by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in matters 
concerning the nature of the state, in the post-Mubarak era (2011- 2013). Simultaneously, that 
discourse is placed in the historical context of the Brotherhood’s ideological development 
over the decades, particularly during the Mubarak era (1981-2011).  
Methodology 
Ideology and Discourse 
Thus, the main task of this research is to analyse Muslim Brotherhood discourse, while 
placing that discourse in its historical context. However, “discourse” is a very diffuse term 
invoking a plethora of possible meanings. Moreover, it is strongly connected to the equally 
diffuse concept of “ideology”. What exactly do I attempt to research, when adopting these 
terms? It has been argued that ideology and discourse have come to mean the same thing, 
and that “their conceptual apparatus can now be used interchangeably”.10 However, for me 
there is an important distinction to be made, which, for the purpose of this thesis, I have 
summarized in a preliminary definition as follows: ideology pertains to a set of beliefs and 
desires, while discourse is the medium through which that ideology is both constructed and 
transmitted. By maintaining this distinction, I hold that ideology is in its most basic form 
unwritten, a way to “see” (believe) reality around us, or to “want” (desire) a certain reality to 
happen. At the same time, however, we start to interpret that reality, organizing it into 
comprehensible language to help ourselves and others understand what we see and want. 
Thus, discourse and ideology set in motion simultaneous, intertwined and complementing 
processes.   
Certainly, ‘seeing’ and ‘wanting’ do not happen in a historical vacuum. Individuals 
are influenced by discursive traditions coming before them, meaning that, following 
Foucault’s line of thought, “a human being turns himself into a subject"11, even before 
ideological processes are set in motion. The process described by Foucault is what Althusser 
has called “interpellation”.12 Foucault’s assertion certainly holds true for the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, who before embarking on ideological production would have seen 
                                 
10 Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, “Discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology, discourse, 
ideology. . .”, The British Journal of Sociology,  44 (1993), 475. 
11 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, Critical Inquiry, 8 (1982), 778. 
12 Purvis and Hunt, “Discourse, Ideology”, 482 
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themselves as ‘Muslims’ or even ‘Muslim reformers’13. However, I think that an ideological 
process distinguishes itself from the discursive in that it utilizes and directs discursive 
practices to achieve a certain goal of reshaping social relations. This idea is adopted from Trevor 
Purvis and Alan Hunt, who in distinguishing ideology from discourse, put forward the 
concept of “directionality”14 of ideology and the “’ideological effects’”15 of discourse: “Thus 
what makes some discourses ideological is their connections with systems of domination”, 
“the way in which the interpellation of subject positions operates systematically to reinforce 
and reproduce dominant social relations.”16  
Purvis and Hunt’s concept of ideological directionality provides a tool for 
distinguishing ideological elements in discursive practices, and will be adopted in this thesis. 
When analysing the Muslim Brotherhood’s discourse of the post-Mubarak era, can I detect 
directional, ideological elements that tells us what kind of state the Muslim Brothers envision 
in a post-Mubarak era? And if so, how are these elements weaved into the various discursive 
products under study? Moreover, how can these ideological and discursive elements be 
placed in their historical context? What historical factors contributed to the way the Brothers 
went about their business of constructing discourse after Mubarak’s fall?  
Discourse Analysis 
Having clarified the relation between discourse and ideology, I will have to explain the 
methodology I employ when analysing the Brotherhood’s discourse of the post-Mubarak era. 
Based on methodological literature, I have set myself a few guidelines, as well as limitations, 
for exercising the practice of Discourse Analysis. Discourse Analysis is a set of academic 
tools that helps understand how texts are constructed and the way meaning is embedded 
within them. As H.G. Widdowson and Teun van Dijk have stressed, discursive products 
must be analysed in their respective contexts in order to elicit the meaning embedded in 
them.17 Van Dijk goes on to say that “Contexts control discourse production and 
comprehension”18, since contexts enable “that language users are able to shape their 
discourse appropriately to the (for them) relevant properties of the communicative 
                                 
13 The background of Muslim Brotherhood thought will be further elaborated on in the first chapter.  
14 Purvis and Hunt, “Discourse, Ideology”, 478. Originally italicized.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, p. 497. 
17 H.G. Widdowson, Text, Context and Pretext: Critical Issues in Discourse Analysis. 
Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Backwell Publishing, 2004, 36-57, Teun van Dijk, Discourse and 
Context: A Sociocognitive Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 1-27 
18 Van Dijk, Discourse and Context, 17 
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situation.”19 Thus, although Discourse Analysis has a long tradition of an exclusively textual 
approach (analysing the words, grammar, sentence structure, and build-up of the text), my 
approach will be mainly contextual, adopting van Dijks assertion that, to understand 
discursive practices, one has to study what Widdowson calls the “extralinguistic reality”20 of 
the contexts involved. To this aim, I have developed a set of questions to help determine the 
relevant contextual properties that need to be examined, when reading discursive texts:  
 
1. Who produced the text? Who is that person or collective, and what does he/she/it 
represent?  
2. Where was the text published, if at all? Who or what is that publishing platform, and 
what does it represent? 
3. When was the text published? 
4. With what intention was the text produced?   
 
The last question is of special interest, and should be expanded on a bit further. Does the 
writer have a certain goal in mind? Is it a reaction to a person, event or text? Does it initiate a 
certain trend or phenomenon? Was the text written defensively or offensively (this is also an 
important question for textual analysis), deliberately or reluctantly? The supposed goal or 
aim of a text producer with a certain text is what Widdowson calls “pretext”.21 
Frame Analysis 
Focusing on the contextual does not mean, of course, that the textual aspects of discourses 
are not important. In fact, in order to discern the pretext behind a text, textual analysis plays 
an important role. Within texts, the most important concept I will look at is the use of 
“frames”. The study of Frame Analysis focuses on how texts are inlaid with frames, through 
which meaning in a text is interpreted and located. The concept of frames in textual analysis 
was introduced in Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis, in which he defined frames as 
“principles of organization which govern events - at least social ones - and our subjective 
involvement in them”, or “schemata of interpretation”, with Frame Analysis helping to 
                                 
19 Ibid.  
20 Widdowson, Text, Context and Pretext , 8. 
21 Ibid, p. 74 
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understand “the organization of experience”.22 Thus, according to Snow and Benford, 
“Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize 
experience and guide action.”23   
To give an example: police shootings of African-American individuals in the U.S. 
have been framed as manifestations of ‘social injustice’ and ‘racial inequality’. Because of 
these frames, people felt compelled to organize and join marches to protest against this 
perceived injustice and inequality. Moreover, these frames stand in a historical context, 
immediately invoking the language of the civil rights movement in the 1960’s, historical 
knowledge that is well-known throughout the country. This is why the use of frames is very 
important for social movements in achieving their goals, as movement leaders can construct 
new and adopt or recompose existing frames in order to “mobilize political adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”24 To translate this 
line of thought to the context of my research, Brotherhood leaders construct their message 
with the use of frames, in order to mobilize adherents, garner the support of bystanders, or 
demobilize antagonists. When analysing the Brotherhood’s messages, what kinds of frames 
can be distinguished? Furthermore, how do these frames support the Brotherhood’s goals 
(pretext)? Ultimately, how do they relate to the Brotherhood’s ideology on statehood?  
 However, as Marc Steinberg highlights, there is a danger to see frames as readymade 
constructs with fixed meanings, which can simply be utilized by actors to affect their 
audiences as they wish. Influenced by Mikhail Bakhtin, Steinberg puts framing processes 
within a discursive context, while interpreting discourse as “the social production of 
meaning that is essentially dialectic, dynamic and riven with contradictions”25. Steinberg 
asserts that “Discourse is (…) interdiscourse, since meaning always lies between and within 
the confluence of voices that compose communication.”26 Adopting Steinberg’s discursive 
perception of “framing as an inherently collective process”, 27 I contend that any frames used 
by Brotherhood leaders are not simply of their own production, but are a product of 
                                 
22 Erving Goffman, Frame Analyis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Cambridge (U.S.): 
Harvard University Press, 1974, 10-11, 21. My italics. 
23 Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000), 614.  
24 Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, “Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization”, 
International Social Movement Research, 1 (1988), 198. 
25 Marc. W Steinberg, “Tilting the frame: Considerations on collective action 
framing from a discursive turn”, Theory and Society , 27 (1998), 851-852. 
26 Steinberg, “Tilting the Frame”, 853. My italics on “between”. 
27 Ibid, p. 862. 
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interaction between them and others. Thus, the question of frame in my research is enhanced 
by the additional analytical task of determining how the frames adopted by Brotherhood 
actors resonate with issues and movements in Egyptian society at large.   
 The methods of Discourse and Frame Analysis will be applied in the last chapter of 
the thesis, when analysing the Muslim Brotherhood’s discursive productions of the post-
Mubarak era. The main reason for this is that I am limited in the source material available to 
me. As my command of Modern Standard Arabic is not sufficient to read the Brotherhood’s 
texts in their original form, I depend on English translations of their texts in order to be able 
to apply analysis. English translations of Brotherhood texts are scarce for the Mubarak 
period; in contrast, they are affluently available for the post-Mubarak era. As a result, direct 
analysis of Brotherhood texts in this thesis is applied only for the post-Mubarak era. The 
historical analysis of the Brotherhood’s ideological and discursive development during the 
Mubarak era will be conducted with the use of academic literature on the topic.  
Boundaries of the thesis 
Issues under analysis 
In analysing the Brotherhood’s ideology and discourse, I have chosen to focus on the topic of 
‘the nature of the state’, thus analysing the Brothers’ opinion on what a state should be. 
However, this is a broad topic in itself, covering a wide range of different issues. Therefore, I 
need to be clear on what issues I specifically focus on. To this aim, I have made a selection of 
issues that I have found to be of central importance to the Muslim Brothers’ discourse when 
addressing ‘the nature of the state’:  
1. The source of political authority. Who has or should have the ultimate authority to rule?  
Where should the source of political power be ultimately vested in?  
2. The authority of God’s word in state and society. In Islam, the word of God as handed 
down to man in the Qur’an holds authority over the lives of humans, and is the 
source of Islamic law (Shari’a). Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
attempt to bring that authority ‘back’ (perceiving its absence) into the lives of 
Muslims and the state apparatus.  But how should the Qur’an be interpreted and 
applied, and who should be entrusted with its interpretation? Also, what is the role of 
the state in ensuring the application of God’s authority in society? This issue has 
considerable overlap with the abovementioned issue, but the two are nonetheless 
treated as separate issues by the Brotherhood, causing confusion and controversy for 
outsiders.  
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3. Citizenship. What is a ‘citizen’ in the Muslim Brotherhood’s point of view? What are 
their rights and duties? Are there differences between citizens or are all citizens 
equal?   
4. The internal organization of the state. How should the state be organized internally? 
Through what institutions should the state govern?  
5. The power relations between state institutions. How should power de divided among the 
different institutions of the state? What are the rights and duties of the different 
institutions?  
Focusing on the Mubarak and the post-Mubarak period 
Why do I focus on the Mubarak and the post-Mubarak period?  There are two main reasons. 
First, as the permissible amount of words in this Master’s thesis is rather limited, a focus on 
these two periods will provide room for in-depth study. Second, the Mubarak era witnessed 
important changes regarding the development of the Muslim Brothers’ discourse and 
ideology as well as its position vis-à-vis the secular national state. Simultaneously, the 
Mubarak era represented a relatively stable political paradigm in Egypt for nearly three 
decades. Thus, the years 1981-2011 act as a historical ‘template’ which can be used to 
understand the language and position of the Muslim Brothers during the period following 
Mubarak’s resignation.  
Buildup of thesis 
The first chapter serves as a historical introduction to the Muslim Brotherhood. Here I will 
briefly introduce the reader with the movement’s organizational and ideological foundations 
as envisioned by the Brotherhood’s founding father, Hassan al-Banna’, its historical 
inspirations, and further developments up to the Mubarak period. In the second chapter, I 
will document the Brothers’ ideological and discursive developments during the Mubarak 
era regarding its viewpoint on the nature of the state. Also, these developments are placed in 
their respective historical contexts, in order to see what contextual factors influenced the 
course of the Brotherhood’s developments. In the third chapter, a selection of the 
Brotherhood’s most important discursive products concerning the nature of the state, 
released in the years after Mubarak’s resignation, will be analysed in-depth. Here I will 
elaborate on the frames, contexts and further discursive elements that the Brotherhood 
adopted in their political discourse, as well as the pretext with which discourse was 
produced. In the conclusion, I will compare the analysis of the discourse with the Brothers’ 
13 
 
ideological developments, and engage in an explanation regarding the relations between 
them.  
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1. Origins: from al-Banna’ to al-
Hudaybi 
The Idea: Islamic reformism and Hassan al-Banna’ 
When the “Society of Muslim Brothers”, or Muslim Brotherhood, was officially established in 
March 1928 in the Egyptian town of Isma’iliya28, its ideals were not new to the Islamic world. 
Rather, the organization must the viewer in the broader context of reformist Islamic thought. 
The Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan al-Banna’, a schoolteacher hailing from the Nile Delta 
region, built upon some of the intellectual ideas put forward by nineteenth-century reformist 
thinkers. In a time when Europe was quickly gaining economic and political power in the 
ailing Ottoman Empire and other Muslim states, thinkers like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and 
Muhammad ‘Abduh started to ask why Islamic civilizations had fallen under European 
influence. The answer, according to these thinkers, laid in the fact that Muslim societies had, 
over the course of history, lost touch with the true essence of original Islam as represented in 
the first generations of Muslims. Internal divisions and later foreign influences had crippled 
Islam; thus, as ‘Abduh argued, Muslim societies had to go back to when Islam was 
undivided and unaffected by outside influences. The Qur’an, God’s direct word, and the 
Sunna, the collected words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, could be, and had to be, 
directly read and interpreted outside of the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
who had over the centuries established themselves as authorities on interpreting Islamic Law 
(Shari’a) in their own right.29 In this way, Muslims as a whole could be reunited and regain 
their inner strength. This is not to say that these Islamic reformists resisted Western 
technological innovation or ‘modernity’ as such. Rather, they envisioned Islam to be the 
civilizational fundament for modern life in Muslim societies.30 These basic tenets and goals 
gave birth to a movement which became known as Islamism. 
                                 
28 Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: the rise of an Islamic mass movement, 
1928-1942. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998, 36 
29 Ali Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival. Kuala Lumpur/Beirut/London, New York: 
SIRD/WBP/Zed Books; 2005) p. 36-37. 
30 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939.  London/New York/Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1962,  138-139. 
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 In this framework, Hasan al-Banna’ developed his vision for the Muslim Brothers. For 
all Banna’, the ultimate goal was creating an “Islamic order” (al-Nizam al-Islami) based fully 
on Islamic values, having in mind the ideal example of the first generations of Muslims and 
the Islamic Caliphate under “Rightly Guided Caliphs”.31 However, setting up a concrete 
Islamic political state was not the goal itself; rather, al-Banna’ saw a unified Muslim Umma 
(meaning ‘people’ or ‘nation’) as the ultimate goal, whose lives would be guided by shari’a, 
whatever the exact structure of the state.32 Al-Banna’ describes an Islamic form of 
government as “a government whose officers are Muslims who perform the obligatory 
duties of Islam … and who work and execute their plans according to Islamic teachings.”33 
The real threat to the Umma, reasoned al-Banna’, was not the Western structure of state, but 
Western values and culture, which brought “greedy ambitions”, “materialism”, “dissension” 
and injustice34 to Muslim countries. Consequently, Western influence had placed Muslim 
people out of touch with God’s will. Therefore, Muslims had to be brought back to Islam, 
and shari’a, representing God’s will, had to be reinstated as the authority over Muslims’ lives. 
This spiritual revival of the Umma was the true essence of what al-Banna’ called “the Islamic 
fatherland”, which “transcended the bounds of mere geographical and ethnic patriotism to 
one of lofty principles, pure, veracious articles of belief, and truths which God set down as a 
guidance and a light for the world.”35  
 Therefore, al-Banna’ fought against some elements in Egyptian society while being at 
peace with others. Because of the centrality of the shari’a in his vision, a principal aim was the 
abolition of Western forms of law, which had been introduced in Egypt following 
Napoleon’s invasion in 1798, and implement shari’a instead. However, al-Banna’ was 
decidedly vague on how to implement shari’a. The Islamist ideal was that any Muslim could 
read and understand God’s will from the sources, bypassing the traditional fiqh 
                                 
31 Richard, Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers. London: Oxford University Press, 1969,  
234-236. The Ruightly Guided Caliphs were the first four successors of Prophet Muhammad, and were 
instrumental in establishing the Islamic Caliphate, which until the 13th century CE was one of the 
important civilizational centres of the world. 
32 Mitchell, The Society, 235. 
33Hassan al-Banna’, Message for Youth. Translated by H. Muhammad Najm. London: Ta-Ha 
Publishers Ltd., 1993, 11 
34 Charles Wendell, trans., Five tracts of Ḥasan Al-Banna ̄ʾ (1906-1949): a selection from the 
Majmūʿat rasāʾil al-Imām al shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannāʾ, Santa Barbara: University of California 
Press, 1978, 78, 95, 107 
35 Wendell, Five Tracts, 94 
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establishments. At other instances, though, he directed his followers to study the works of 
the fiqh schools.36 Another important goal was the eradication of injustice and division in 
Egypt, manifested in the usurpation of power and resources by the upper class at the 
expense of the middle and lower classes. At that time, politics was a reserve for the well to-
do, safeguarded from possible participation of the middle class. Additionally, political 
parties relied on British support, who maintained political control despite Egypt’s 
parliamentary and constitutional independence in 1922. This is why al-Banna’ fiercely 
rejected party politics (hizbiyya) seeing it as a tool of corruption, inequality and Western 
power.37 On the other hand, al-Banna’ was in favour of keeping the Constitution and 
parliament as a base for governance, arguing that these institutions are perfectly compatible 
to the Islamic ideals of equality and justice because they oversee and limit the powers of 
authoritative bodies.38 
The Method: grassroots approach, structure and hierarchy 
However, if the Brotherhood were to ‘bring Islam back into the lives of Muslims’, the 
Brotherhood would have to operate on a grassroots level rather than adopting a top-down 
approach. Indeed, al-Banna’ identified a set of stages to be implemented, starting with 
“Reforming the self”, followed by the family, society, the country, the government, all the 
Islamic nations, and the prominence of Islamic civilization over others worldwide.39 The task 
of reforming Muslims on the individual level was called da’wa, meaning ‘call’ or ‘summon’, 
as Muslims had to be summoned anew to Islam.40 The da’wa mission became and remained 
the methodological and organizational cornerstone of the movement. Being a schoolteacher, 
al-Banna’ deplored the general lack of Qur’anic knowledge among the populace; to him, 
religious education was the key to ‘reforming the self’, so the Brothers spent considerable 
effort in providing this.41 Additionally, the Brothers addressed social and economic needs by 
providing education on morality and public health, and by setting up businesses, schools 
and even hospital clinics,42 becoming a full-fledged social movement and gaining 
widespread support for its integrated efforts.  
                                 
36 al-Banna’, Message, 7, Wendell, Five Tracts, 89  
37 Lia, The Society, 203.  
38 Ibid., 204, Mitchell, The Society, 261.  
39 al-Banna’, Message, 10-12 
40 Lia, The Society, 33  
41 Ibid., 56-57 
42 Mitchell, The Society, 274-279, 289-291   
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 Simultaneously, al-Banna’ set up a strong organizational structure with hierarchal 
characteristics. Al-Banna’s authoritative style initially sparked severe arguments between 
him and other leaders, but in the end al-Banna’s authority triumphed. The central executive 
organ became the “Guidance Bureau”, which supervised all the Brotherhood’s committees 
and was answerable only to the “General Guide” of the movement (al-Banna’ being the 
first).43 Also, the Consultative “Shura” Council was set up. Based on the Islamic concept of 
Shura, meaning ‘consultation’,44 the body met once a year to elect the Guidance Bureau 
members and provide general advice on the progress of the organization.45 Full obedience of 
members to their superiors was demanded; al-Banna’ made sure this was adhered to by 
requiring all new members to take an oath of allegiance (bay’a) to him personally, or to his 
representatives in the branch organizations throughout the country.46 Thus, the Muslim 
Brotherhood developed into a grassroots social movement with a highly organized and 
hierarchal structure, adopting a top-down chain-of-command, with clear boundaries 
between those who were and were not members of the Jama’a (‘group’ or ‘society’), as the 
Brotherhood became known. 
Repression, Qutbism and its aftermath  
As the Brotherhood rapidly grew in the 1930’s and 1940’s, its impact in society became larger 
and its language more defiant. Riding the momentum, its young members became impatient 
to effect change, especially vis-à-vis the British-controlled political establishment.47 
Ultimately, this led to violence; Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi was 
assassinated by a young Brotherhood member on 28 December 1949. However, this 
prompted the retaliatory murder of Hasan al-Banna’ himself on 12 February 1949.48 Hassan 
Isma’il al-Hudaybi, a jurist, succeeded the deceased al-Banna’, but the Brotherhood was 
bereft of its iconic leader.  
 Antagonism between the government and the Brotherhood continued when a group 
of army officers deposed the government in July 1952 and forced the British out of Egypt, 
ushering in a new era of military-led governance. Jamal ‘abd al-Nasir, becoming president of 
Egypt in 1954, escaped an alleged assassination attempt by a Muslim Brother in 1952, and the 
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Brotherhood was vigorously shut down and persecuted, with dozens of Brothers executed 
and thousands imprisoned.49 Among the prisoners was Sayyid Qutb. 
 In the two decades of severe government repression of the Brotherhood, Qutb 
developed new Islamist ideas which created serious divisions within the Brotherhood and 
inspired a new era of violent Islamism. The essence of Qutbist thought is the adoption of two 
juxtaposed concepts mutually excluding each other; humankind either lived under 
hakimiyyat allah (God’s sovereignty) or in jahiliyya (ignorance).50 According to Qutb, “all the 
existing so-called ‘Muslim’ societies are also jahili societies … because their way of life is not 
based on submission to God alone.” 51 Qutb then adopted the concept of jihad as a violent 
struggle against the jahili societies with the aim of imposing hakimiyyat allah.52  
 Qutb’s writings gained considerable traction within Brotherhood ranks, but with the 
release of Brotherhood leaders by al-Nasir’s successor Anwar al-Sadat, the Qutbist trend was 
separated from the Brotherhood’s Jama’a.53 In a tract called Du’at la Qudat (Preachers not 
Judges), the Brotherhood leadership negated Qutb’s polarized worldview, arguing that 
ultimate judgment over mankind lies with God alone.54 Moreover, Du’at la Qudat claimed 
that living in a non-Islamic system of state does not mean a Muslim cannot live by the tenets 
of an Islamic order: he can still live by God’s law and the Islamic way of life that derives 
from that law.55 In this way, Brotherhood leaders re-established their authority over the 
Jama’a, and, following al-Banna’s example, focused on rebuilding the organization’s 
structure.  
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2. The Mubarak Years 
 ‘Umar al-Tilmisani and the move towards electoral politics 
Arguably the most significant move undertaken by the Muslim Brotherhood during the 
Mubarak era was its decision to participate in electoral politics, in cooperation with both 
Islamist and non-Islamist parties.56 Building on the idea, as presented in Du’at la Qudat, that a 
Muslim could enact Islamic ideals while accepting a secular state and its political framework, 
the Brotherhood’s leaders began to advocate their Islamist vision as compatible with and 
achievable through the secular system of state in Egypt. 
‘Umar al-Tilmisani, who was the group’s General Guide from 1972 to 1986, was a 
leading force in the Brotherhood’s new outlook, both practically and ideologically. Al-
Tilmisani wrote “Religious Government– a System Foreign to Islam” and “Islam and 
Religious Government”57, to expound his views concerning Islam and governance. However, 
these works must be evaluated in the context of developments in Egypt and in the wider 
Muslim world: the rise of Islamist militant groups in Egypt, such as Jama’a al-Islamiyya and 
al-Jihad, who were inspired by Sayyid Qutb’s ideas, and the installation of a theocratic 
regime in Iran raised new questions about the relation between Islam and governance, and 
put a certain pressure on the Brotherhood to show how it related itself to politics.58 In the 
two documents, al-Tilmisani clearly distances himself from militant Islamists and theocracies 
by differentiating between “religious government” and “Muslim government”.59 Religious 
government, he argued, is a system in which the ruler, legitimizing his rule as sanctioned by 
God, can rule by decree, according to his personal fashion; such a system, according to al-
Tilmisani, is bound for corruption and violence. Rather, al-Tilmisani envisioned a Muslim 
government, wherein the ruler’s principle task is to implement Islamic law; if a ruler failed 
doing so, the ‘people’ should oust him. Representation of those ‘people’ is secured through 
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the adoption of shura, ‘constultation’. In al-Tilmisani’s view, the ruler is thus obligated to 
consult the people on Islamic law, and the latter can oust the ruler from his post should his 
rule be found in violation of shari’a.60 However, while arguing that modern political 
institutions are capable of exercising shura, al-Tilmisani does not stipulate which institution 
specifically is to fulfil the role of shura.61  Nevertheless, by further developing the 
Brotherhood’s political thought as well as bringing its political ideals in line with existing 
political institutions in Egypt, al-Tilmisani broke new ground and set the Brotherhood on the 
path to political participation.   
Al-Tilmisani’s ground-breaking views reflected changes within the Brotherhood’s 
ranks. A new influx of young and politically ambitious members started to enter the 
Brotherhood by the early 1980’s. Described by Wickham and Shehata as the “middle 
generation”,62 many of those had become activists through the influential student 
movements in the 1970’s, criticizing Sadat’s economic policies and his rapprochement with the 
United States, and had come into contact with Islamism through movements such as al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya and the Muslim Brotherhood, who were very active on university 
campuses throughout that decade.63 Prominent members of this generation like Abu al-‘Ila 
Madi, ‘Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Futuh and ‘Isam al-‘Aryan had gained much political 
experience and, importantly, had worked together with non-Islamist political actors, 
providing the Brotherhood with experiences and skills it had hitherto lacked.64 While their 
outward outlook would set them on confrontational terms with the Brotherhood’s older 
members, focusing on the da’wa-oriented mission of the movement, al-Tilmisani recognized 
the ambitions of the younger members and the need to reform. Thus, he acted as an 
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intermediary between the old and new generation, maintaining stability in the movement 
and steering the Brotherhood’s growing energy and resources into a dual direction.65  
The new outlook was (in good Brotherhood tradition) promptly met with action. In 
anticipation of the 1984 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood made a remarkably bold 
step by allying itself to the secular-nationalist Wafd Party, in a bid to gain seats in the 
Assembly.66 Although this certainly raised a number of eyebrows within Brotherhood ranks, 
the move is a good example of how influential the new outlook had already become. The 
Brotherhood gained a meagre seven to eight seats out of the 58 secured by the alliance as a 
whole, but it proved only to be a small first step. By the next parliamentary elections in 1987, 
the Brotherhood, in an “Islamic alliance” with the al-‘Amal and al-Ahrar Party, gained 36 to 
38 seats (out of a total of 56 secured by the alliance) and were suddenly the largest 
opposition bloc in parliament.67  
Muslim Brothers into the syndicates and parliament 
While the Brotherhood’s attempt at parliamentary politics was a success on paper, in practice 
it still had limited power to influence policy. Although the Brotherhood consistently called 
for the implementation of shari’a, which, as they argued, was obligatory under the 1971 
Constitution,68 their advice went largely unheeded by Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic 
Party (NDP). Thus, the Brotherhood sought to broaden their base via other platforms as well. 
They found such a platform in the professional syndicates; these institutions, while in 
principle being under Mubarak’s wing through the government-appointed naqib (syndicate 
president), nevertheless elected its own members, thus lending Muslim Brothers the 
opportunity to contest its seats.69 Moreover, professional syndicates provided the activist- 
and middle-class oriented Brotherhood with a direct possibility to implement policy 
regarding the professionals they represented, thus having an opportunity to show fellow 
                                 
65 Ranko, “The Muslim Brotherhood”, 90, Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood 52. 
66 Ranko, “The Muslim Brotherhood”, 82-83, Shehata, “Islamists and Non-Islamists”, 139, 
Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 49. It must be noted that, because the Muslim Brotherhood did 
not receive legal status under Mubarak, it could only run for parliamentary seats either as 
independent candidates or under the wing of another party.  
67 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood 47, al-Din Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Activism”, 646-647, 
Ranko, “The Muslim Brotherhood”, 115-116. The sources disagree on the exact amount of seats 
won by the Brotherhood.  
68 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood 56. Article 2 of the Eygptian Constitution stated that the 
country’s legislation should be based on shari’a principles.  
69 ‘Abdo, No God but God ,72-73, Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood 59, 61 
22 
 
Egyptians what Brotherhood policies would look like. The Brotherhood’s venture into the 
syndicates proved to be very successful: in syndicate elections from 1987 to 1992, the 
Brothers captured 80% of board seats in the doctors’ syndicate, 75% in the lawyers’ 
syndicate, and 88,5% in the engineers’ syndicate,70 margins that they largely held until 1995.71  
Moreover, after their impressive victories, the Brothers gained a reputation of good 
governance: genuinely representing all its members, they set about eliminating corruption in 
syndicates, boosting its financial reserves, setting up affordable health insurance, loans and 
pensions for its members, pressuring the government to increase professionals’ salaries, and 
speaking out on political matters such as unemployment, government use of torture and 
even foreign affairs.72 Perhaps most conspicuously, the Brotherhood leadership genuinely 
upheld regular democratic processes in syndicate elections: whether they resulted in a 
Brotherhood victory or loss, syndicate elections overseen by Brotherhood members were 
credited by others for their regularity and fairness.73 The Brothers gained such a favourable 
standing that even Copts voted for them.74 
  At the same time, the Brothers in parliament were increasingly framing their Islamist 
goals in liberal democratic discourse.  To implement shari’a in society was not propagated 
anymore as an obligatory submission of the people to God’s superior directives, but as the 
natural will of the majority Muslim population. Under the auspices of Hamid Abu al-Nasr, 
who had succeeded al-Tilmisani as General Guide and continued on the path set out by his 
predecessor, the Brothers campaigned for parliamentary seats in 1987 promising on 
“accomplishing the hopes and wishes of the public’ by removing contradictions between 
people’s faith and the laws that governed them”.75 Not only was implementing shari’a 
framed as a democratic task, but also as a way to defend constitutional rights. Applying 
shari’a would defend the people’s economic and social rights, as the Brothers pointed out that 
decades of secular governance had failed to do so.76  
                                 
70 ‘Abdo, No God but God, 90, 95, Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood 60,  
71  Fahmi, “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood”, 552-553 
72 ‘Abdo, No God but God, 93, 97-98, Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood 61-62. 
73 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood 63 
74 ‘Abdo, No God but God , 94-95 
75 Sumita Pahwa, “Secularizing Islamism and Islamizing Democracy: The Political and 
Ideational Evolution of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers 1984-2012”, Mediterranean Politics,  
18 (2013), 139 
76 Utvik, Bjorn Olav, “Filling the vacant throne of Nasser: The economic discourse of Egypt's 
Islamist opposition”, Arab Studies Quarterly, 17 (1995) 
23 
 
The Brothers’ liberal democratic discourse is perhaps most interestingly exemplified 
in their categorization of shari’a. Brotherhood leaders started to differentiate between fixed 
shari’a rulings (ahkam), which are to be followed to the letter, and flexible rulings, which are 
time and place sensitive, and thus need human interpretation (ijtihad). While the Brothers 
applied ahkam to moral-cultural realm (for example rulings forbidding alcohol, drugs or 
usury), they argued that ijtihad should be applied to rulings in the political and economic 
realm,77 thus leaving the question of state structure and the exact position of shari’a in state 
law open to debate. As a consequence, Brotherhood MP Muhammad ‘Abd al-Quddus 
argued in parliament in 1984, shari’a was in need of individual freedom and freedom of 
speech in order to practice ijtihad.78 This argument was extended to Brotherhood leaders’ 
acceptance of political pluralism. In parliament, the argument ran, different political parties 
can represent different opinions regarding the application of shari’a, just as the traditional 
schools of jurisprudence (fiqh) represent a variety of thought.79 However, the Brothers’ 
embracing of political pluralism and individual freedom shows to be strongly limited, 
because both values were only allowed within the boundaries of shari’a.  
The Muslim Brotherhood’s framing of their Islamist visions in a liberal democratic 
discourse might be seen as a deceptive façade: while the Brothers used liberal democratic 
language to assure others their goals were in line with liberal democratic values, they made 
no attempt to intrinsically adopt those values. However, internal debates on liberal and 
democratic principles were definitely on-going. In 1994, the Muslim Brotherhood released 
“Treatise on the Shura Principle in Islam and Party Pluralism in the Muslim Society”, 80 an 
official Muslim Brotherhood publication released in 1994, probably written by the younger 
reformist members under General Guide Hamid Abu al-Nasr.81 In this treatise, the 
Brotherhood officially repeated their acceptance of liberal democratic concepts such as 
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political pluralism (viewing pluralism as “a necessary institutionalization of God-given  
differences”82) and freedom of thought, and explicitly called for the establishment of a 
written Constitution in order to separate the powers, especially to establish judicial oversight 
over the executive power.83 However, the Brotherhood’s endorsement of these concepts was 
conditional: “…as long as the shari’a is the highest Constitution.”84 Like al-Tilmisani had 
done before, the treatise interpreted the concept of shura as a right that ‘the people’ have over 
the executive power, albeit in clearer and stronger wording. Absolute power is in the hands 
of the Umma and they can choose their ‘ruler’ as they see fit, and check or depose him if he 
does not rule according to the Constitution or shari’a.85 Thus, it was ‘the people’ as the source 
of all temporal power, based on their will to live according to God’s law.  In addition, the 
Brotherhood released “Statement to the People”, in April 1995, reiterating the Brotherhood’s 
commitment to abovementioned democratic principles, for example popular sovereignty: 
“The legitimacy of government in a Muslim society should be derived from the consent and 
choice of the people (…) people have the right to invent different systems, formulas, and 
techniques that suit the conditions.”86 Also, it acknowledged full citizenship and civic rights 
for Copts, stating that “they have the same rights and duties as we do (…) Whoever acts or 
believes otherwise is forsaken by us.”87  
For all their clarity on general issues, these documents do not clarify an important 
part of the Islamist project, namely, who or which specific institution has the right to 
interpret shari’a. Although “Treatise on the Shura Principle in Islam and Party Pluralism in 
the Muslim Society” states that shari’a should be upheld by an “independent judiciary”, 88 it 
does not clarify what institution exactly. Pahwa notes that the Brotherhood “called for 
applying shariah largely within existing legislative and constitutional arrangements” and 
that they “sought to use the courts, the legislature and the Azhari establishment to 
implement shariah.”89 Exact stipulation on who should interpret shari’a, therefore, remained 
conspicuously absent. 
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Thus, while these documents show that the Brotherhood started to intrinsically accept 
liberal democratic values and the existing political framework, the conditional acceptance of 
these concepts within the limits of shari’a meant a continuing ideological ambiguity with the 
Brotherhood. Perhaps, they highlight a generational struggle between the older, da’wa 
oriented group and the middle generation reformists, as Carrie Wickham has suggested.90 
Whatever the case, the apparent ambiguities within these texts would be of consequence 
later on.  
All the while, the Brotherhood’s less political, da’wa-oriented activities continued,  
typically led by the Brotherhood’s veteran leaders, who were steeped into the traditional 
way of Islamist activism initiated by founder Hasan al-Banna’, and were reluctant to mingle 
in politics due to their experience in prison in the 1950’s and 1960’s.91 Spanning a vast 
network, the Brothers continued to set up or affiliate themselves with organizations 
providing social services to the poor, hospitals and clinics and schools. In addition, the 
Brotherhood continued to organize education of the Qur’an and other Islamic knowledge in 
mosques, as they had done since the 1920’s. Furthermore, da’wa-minded Islamic 
entrepreneurs set up businesses, providing jobs and much needed capital to support the 
Brothers’ political ambitions.92 Ironically, even the apolitical activism turned out to have 
considerable political value: the Brotherhood’s hard work in virtually every segment of 
society earned them broad grassroots support, leverage that was turned into “immediate 
political weight”93 when the Brotherhood organized mass rallies in 1991 to openly decry 
Egypt’s participation in the U.S.-led Gulf War in Kuwait and Iraq. Also, when in 1992 Cairo 
was hit by a strong earthquake, leaving around 500 dead and thousands without homes, 
Islamist health teams were much quicker in reacting to the disaster, being the first to provide 
immediate relief to victims, thus publicly embarrassing government health services.94 In 
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addition, the engineers’ syndicate began inspecting houses and donated money for repair.95 
By the mid-1990’s, the Brotherhood clearly demonstrated its willingness and ability to 
provide a wide array of social services to Egyptians in competition with the government, 
thereby challenging the government’s legitimacy in the socio-economic realm.  
State repression and internal division 
By the beginning of the 1990’s, the Egyptian government had become increasingly wary of 
the political growth and assertive role of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although it had 
boycotted the 1990 parliamentary elections, it had gained control of the most important 
professional syndicates in the country; these had asserted a stronger political presence by 
setting up a joint committee to coordinate between the syndicates, holding public 
conferences and issuing political statements.96  Also, the Brothers continued to expand their 
strong presence in public life in general, of which Mubarak was well aware: the mass 
demonstrations in response to the Gulf War of 1991 and the Brothers’ strong response to the 
1992 earthquake were huge embarrassments for a government worried not only about its 
popularity at home, but also abroad. In addition, there was a strong upsurge in domestic 
violence after 1990 from groups such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, who attempted to assassin 
several ministers. In this context, the government moved increasingly to blur the lines 
between violent and non-violent Islamists.97 
Despite some minor measures taken earlier, it was at the parliamentary elections of 
1995 that the Mubarak government started to forcefully remove the Muslim Brotherhood 
from their positions. These parliamentary elections were marked by a level of intimidation 
and violence unprecedented in Mubarak’s time as president. Hundreds of Brotherhood 
leaders and campaigning agents were rounded up and jailed, including prominent political 
figures such as ‘Isam al-‘Aryan, Muhammad Habib and Abu al-Futuh.98 The crackdown on 
the Brotherhood also put an end to Brotherhood influence in the syndicates: syndicate 
leaders such as ‘Isam al-‘Aryan were detained and the syndicates were put under direct 
government surveillance, while confiscating the syndicates’ documents and freezing their 
bank accounts.99 The government now started to label the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 
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organization, in which there was no distinction between them and the militant Islamists. 
During the mass trials of Brotherhood members in 1995, the Brotherhood was branded as 
“enemies of the nation” and it was claimed that the defendants were part of and 
international terrorist network.100 Due to these heavy repressive government measures, the 
Brothers largely retreated from public life after 1995.  
The repressive reaction from the government now put pressure on the Brotherhood’s 
internal relations. The older generation within the Brotherhood, who had experienced full-
fledged state repression before and thus had advocated caution, saw their case now justified. 
Many of the more outspoken and visible Brotherhood members were middle generation 
leaders in the syndicates, and many of them had consequently been detained. This meant the 
older generation was now gaining leverage in the Brotherhood’s leadership, both 
numerically and in advocating their point of view: it was futile to press political issues too 
far, they argued, because sooner or later the government would start to feel threatened and 
crack down on the Brotherhood.   
Many of the remaining middle generation, though, did not buy the older members’ 
mantra. Over the years, they had become impatient with their excessive caution, and also 
disagreed with some of the older members’ viewpoints on Islam and society, which they 
found out-dated. Following a new trend of Islamic thought, called the New Islamic 
Discourse, the middle generation echoed the ideas of scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
which attempted to integrate Islam with Western values of individual freedoms, political 
pluralism, and universal human rights.101 For instance, al-Qaradawi held that the ideal 
Islamic state, which he advocated for, was civil in nature, not religious.102 The middle 
generation members’ more inclusive approach to civil society at large helped push the 
abovementioned documents in 1994 and 1995. The continuing political restraint by the older 
generation, as well as their domination at the decision-making level in the Brotherhood, 
would prove no longer tolerable for some middle generation members. Led by Abu al-‘Ila 
Madi, they set up the Wasat (meaning “middle”) Party, with which they attempted to 
embody their more progressive ideas. There are four main differences between the Wasat 
Party program and official Muslim Brotherhood ideology. First, Wasat Party members state 
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that concerning shari’a, human interpretation (ijtihad) must always be applied, also in the 
moral-cultural realm, in order to correctly apply God’s law in modern times.103 Second, the 
Wasat Party program states that the umma is the absolute source of political power, without 
any reservations. While the Brotherhood attributes a similar power to the umma, they do so 
because they want the law of God, thus implicitly implementing a reservation on this point. 
Also, the Brotherhood and the Wasat Party adopt a different interpretation of the concept of 
umma: while the Brothers understand umma as the ‘community of (Muslim) believers’, the 
Wasat Party views the umma as a ‘national community’, including all Egyptians.104 Third, the 
latter’s conception of umma leads the Wasat Party to interpret pluralism in a much broader 
way, also meaning cultural and religious pluralism, albeit within “the Islamic civilizational 
project”105. By contrast, the Brothers only have room for pluralism within the boundaries of 
interpreting shari’a. Fourth, Wasat Party members grant full equality to Christians and 
women in Egyptian society, including the right to hold the presidential office, a position the 
Muslim Brothers bar women and Christians from.106 The Wasat Party’s founders also 
included women and Copts.107 In all, while the Wasat Party program is not free of 
ambiguities (for example, the question of who should interpret shari’a was left 
unanswered108), they showed a willingness to unambiguously embrace liberal democratic 
concepts such as pluralism and popular sovereignty, thus highlighting the ambiguity of the 
Brothers’ ideology. 
While many middle generation members, either in deed or in spirit, supported the Wasat 
initiative, many others of their generation did not. Dubbed by Carrie Wickham as the 
“conservative pragmatics”109, these middle generation Brotherhood members had embraced 
participation in Egyptian politics and the application of shari’a through the existing political 
system, but did not agree on the more progressive ideas of their reformist-minded 
counterparts. Conservative pragmatics, in contrast to the older generation, were much more 
open to political participation, and were active in civil and political institutions, holding 
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public administrative positions. They were especially well represented in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s parliamentary faction, spearheading their efforts with calling on the 
government to implement shari’a in Egypt and uphold the correct democratic procedures, 
adopting the liberal democratic discourse to achieve these ends.110 Leaders in this group 
included Muhammad ‘Abd al-Quddus, Sa’d al-Katatni, businessman Khairat al-Shatir, 
Muhmmad Habib and Muhammad Mursi.111 Because of their public image and influence 
whilst maintaining good relations with the older generation, this group were to become of 
prime importance in the Brotherhood in the post-Mubarak era.   
The Wasat Party initiative also highlighted the reformists’ frustration with their 
inability to change the Brotherhood from within; although they certainly influenced the 
ideological evolution the Brotherhood had witnessed in the preceding decade, they were 
kept at distance from the Brotherhood’s core decision-making bodies, most importantly the 
Guidance Bureau.112 However, although the older generation seemed to be in control of their 
organization (especially after the government crackdown of 1995), their control did not lead 
to the revocation of the documents produced in 1994 and 1995, or an abandonment of 
participatory politics. Indeed, many among the older members were not against political 
participation per se; they mainly agitated against the reformists’ boldness and pace with 
which they had placed the Brotherhood in the political spotlight. In addition, a succession of 
General Guides, realizing the need to keep the Brotherhood updated with its time, continued 
to act as intermediaries between conservative and progressive members. In this fashion, 
Mustafa Mashhur, succeeding Hamid Abu al-Nasr as General Guide in 1996, upheld the 
relatively progressive ideological trajectory the Brotherhood had theoretically embarked 
upon. Leading the Brothers through its government-imposed period of isolation, he 
channelled the movement’s energies into the preparation of the upcoming parliamentary 
elections of 2000.113  
The 2000’s: the Brotherhood between assertion and restraint 
The political situation in the latter half of the 1990’s had put both the government and the 
Brotherhood in a complex position. Mubarak had kept the country in a state of political 
repression for a number of years, which was becoming more and more untenable seen the 
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pressures society at large was put under. He would have to release the strains or face 
outright revolt. At the same time, it was clear he had not succeeded in eliminating the 
Muslim Brotherhood, his main opponent. The Brothers’ grassroots base, largely set up and 
maintained by its older members, proved unbreakable for the government. Being only able 
to apply pressure from above, Mubarak now had to release that pressure and grant more 
political freedoms. As a result, the parliamentary elections of 2000 were held in a much more 
open atmosphere; Mubarak had handed full judicial control over the elections to the 
courts.114 Also, the government released all of the Brotherhood members jailed in 1995.115 
 The Brotherhood, for their part, sought for a way of manoeuvring the new political 
climate. On the one hand, the newfound freedoms invited renewed political assertion, but 
the Brothers were very wary of a renewed crackdown from the government. In addition, the 
return of influential younger generation leaders from jail such as ‘Isam al ‘Aryan and Abu al-
Futuh accentuated the generational divide within the Brotherhood. As a consequence, the 
Brotherhood would continue to swing “between Self-Assertion and Self-Restraint”116  
throughout the 2000’s.   
In 2000, though, the Brothers agreed that the best way to proceed was with utmost 
caution. While having prepared long for the 2000 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood 
limited its participation, so as not to provoke repressive reactions from the government; it 
fielded a number of 75 candidates, and even changed its main slogan of “al-Islam huwa al-
Hall” (Islam is the solution) to “al-Dustur huwa al-Hall” (the constitution is the solution).117 
The self-imposed caution quickly proved to be of great importance: the NDP, facing losses in 
the first round of voting, quickly resorted to its routine tactics of harassment and 
intimidation. Although the Brotherhood ultimately gained 17 seats in parliament,118 roughly 
the number of all oppositional parties combined, it tried to downplay it gains, stressing that 
the Brotherhood “wants to participate in the system” and that “we don’t want to change the 
Constitution”.119 The Brotherhood’s tendency to show itself as a regular, non-confrontational 
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political participator provided opportunity for the middle generation reformists’ progressive 
ideals, as Abu al-Futuh was quick to announce that “the first priority for us is the same as it 
is for all other groups-freedom; real democracy and real freedom for everyone.”120 Similarly, 
in the syndicate elections of 2001, the Brotherhood limited the number of seats it contested 
and opened its candidate lists to outsiders, even members of Mubarak’s NDP.121  
 The Brotherhood’s self-imposed restraint, however important it seemed at first, 
would prove unfortunate for the movement’s standing in society at large over the next few 
years. The first half of the 2000’s saw the rise of new protest movements with grassroots 
support, producing new generations of protest leaders who would eventually play an 
important part in the downfall of Mubarak in February 2011. Stirred by issues such as the 
second Palestinian intifada in the fall of 2000 and the U.S. invasion of ‘Iraq in March 2003, 
protests broke out in Egypt’s main urban areas, which slowly took a turn from criticizing 
foreign powers to criticizing the Egyptian government.122 One of the most prominent 
movements emerging out of this trend was Kifaya. Although Kifaya (meaning “enough”) 
originally had a small popular base, it was distinct in two ways. First, it was created on a 
genuine cross-partisan base. Its members, which included ex-Brother Abu al-‘Ila Madi, came 
from all corners of the political spectrum, but were united in their clear-cut opposition to the 
Mubarak government.123 Second, Kifaya adopted a confrontational discourse not dared by 
anyone else before.124 To be sure, they were in an easier position to do so, since groups like 
the Brotherhood were under much closer security surveillance. However, their radical 
slogans were quickly picked up by different media and widely disseminated, thus 
amplifying the movement’s impact. Kifaya’s performance prompted a response from the 
Muslim Brothers, who staged large rallies in 2005, albeit with the typical caution. However, 
when Kifaya members tried to work together with the Brotherhood, the latter’s older 
generation leaders were reluctant to fully cooperate with the pronounced secularists.125 
Kifaya thus went ahead searching for other allies, leaving the Brotherhood potentially side-
lined for future events.  
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2005 elections and the older generation’s growing influence 
The 2005 parliamentary elections and its aftermath led the Muslim Brotherhood through a 
rollercoaster of events, and set the parameters determining the Muslim Brothers’ political 
position and attitude towards Egyptian society on the eve of the popular uprising that 
toppled President Mubarak in February 2011. The Brotherhood, emboldened by the 
relatively open political climate of the last few years, felt confident enough to field 160 
candidates for the 2005 parliamentary elections.126 Meanwhile one year earlier, Muhammad 
Mahdi ‘Aqif became the new General Guide succeeding Ma’moun al-Hudaybi (son of former 
Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi), who had died early after succeeding Mustafa Mashhur in 2002.127 
‘Aqif, following the trend set by ‘Umar al-Tilmisani, was clearly of the older generation yet 
acted as a mediator between the different factions within the movement, realising that 
embracing younger generations was important for the future of the movement.128 The 
Brothers’ campaigning was a typical example of their juggling between assertiveness and 
moderation. While they revived their hard-line Islamist slogan “al-Islam huwa al-Hall”, they 
balanced this with conciliatory slogans such as “Partnership, not Domination”.129 Most 
importantly, the Brotherhood used different discourses depending on the audience it 
targeted. Whilst they adopted a moderate tone towards the government and (secular) 
political groups, they used a much more assertive Islamist tone when addressing their grass-
roots followers, depicting the Brotherhood as a guardian for Islam, implying that a vote for 
the Brotherhood “constituted a religious obligation”.130 It is important to remember that the 
Brotherhood, whilst holding much more complex ideological convictions at the leader level, 
relied on uncomplicated Islamist language in order to mobilize their enormous support base 
during elections, most of whom hailed from a lower- to middle-class background and to 
whom the latter kind of language strongly appealed.131 The adoption of a clear-cut Islamist 
discourse was therefore not simply a result of the older and middle generation conservative 
leadership, but also a result of the democratic forces involved.  
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 The Brotherhood tactic handsomely paid off with a historic win: of the 160 candidates 
88 won parliamentary seats, or roughly 20% of the total seats, while the ruling NDP gained 
145 seats, or 32% of the total.132 It was the Brotherhood’s largest win in their political history, 
and decisively showed the movement’s resilience in both popular representation and 
organizational abilities after periods of state repression. Immediately after the elections, the 
Brotherhood’s leadership set up a public relations campaign to reassure the world of its 
commitment to democracy. In an op-ed titled “No need to be afraid of us”, Khairat al-Shatir 
wrote that “the priority is therefore to revitalise political life [in Egypt] so that citizens can 
join a real debate about the solutions to Egypt's chronic problems” and that “…the 
domination of political life by a single political party or group, whether the ruling party, the 
Muslim Brotherhood or any other, is not desirable.”133 But the Egyptian government needed 
no reassuring: immediately after the first round of voting, the government launched a long-
term crackdown intended to systematically curtail the Brotherhood’s newfound political 
influence: more than a thousand Muslim Brothers were detained within the next few years, 
including prominent businessmen as the government again sought to curtail the groups 
financing channels.134 Khairat al-Shatir, for instance, was detained in December 2006.135 
 The government crackdown reinforced a pattern already visible after the previous 
1995 crackdown: the older generations’ argument of extreme caution in the political realm 
and a habit of working in the social realm, out of sight of government surveillance, was again 
justified; many middle generation leaders, both conservative and reformist, who were much 
more publicly exposed, ended up in jail yet again.136 The 88 elected Brotherhood 
parliamentarians, however, enjoyed constitutional protection and could remain in office, 
representing a large foothold of Brotherhood public presence in a period of state 
repression.137 With the publication of two new documents, one of which already published 
before the crackdown, the older generation’s strengthening hand over their organization 
became more pronounced. In 2004, General Guide Muhammad Mahdi ‘Aqif published the 
“Reform Initiative”, a general reform plan for Egypt, followed by the “Draft Party Platform”, 
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(published by the Brotherhood collectively) in 2007.138 ‘Aqif’s “Reform Initiative” was 
remarkable in how similar it was to previous Brotherhood public statements; in fact, the text 
was almost identical to the Brotherhood campaign platform of the 2000 parliamentary 
elections.139 It stressed it support for democratic values, such as designating the people as the 
source of all authority and calling for individual freedom, also using these values to criticize 
the government.140 Interestingly, it also contained a strong support for the traditional da’wa-
oriented goals of the Brotherhood, calling for “Consolidating respect for the fixed values of the 
nation represented in faith in God and His Books and His Prophets and His Laws (…) Giving 
the proponents of the da’wa the freedom to explain the principles and characteristics of Islam 
(…) as a guide to all aspects of life,” and to “rebuild the Egyptian person”.141 Typically, ‘Aqif 
reinforced the Brotherhood habit of binding democratic values in an Islamic framework: “We 
affirm our support for a state system which is a republican, parliamentary, constitutional and 
democratic system in the framework of the principles of Islam.”142 
 The Draft Party Platform, published in August 2007, was designed to show the 
outside world “what a [Muslim Brotherhood] party would look like”,143 in a bid to maintain 
and boost its status as the primal oppositional force in Egypt. It is remarkable in its 
longevity, being the “the most comprehensive programmatic writing in the history of the 
organization”,144 totalling 128 pages.145 In its discourse, it was very similar to ‘Aqif’s “Reform 
Initiative” in reiterating conservative viewpoints, albeit more elaborated. The document 
envisioned a Muslim Brotherhood party as a “civil party with an Islamic frame of 
reference”.146 In the political realm, the Platform advocated values such as ‘adala (justice), 
hurriya (freedom), and shura (consultation), denoting these values as both inherently Islamic 
and democratic.147 However, in the moral-cultural realm, liberal democratic values were 
given much less space. In line with ‘Aqif’s ‘fixed values of the nation’, the Draft Party 
Platform opined that family and public life be governed by the ‘fixed rulings’ (ahkam) of 
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shari’a.148 This meant, for example, that women should be barred from occupying the position 
of president, in line with “well established principles of Sharia”, as were Christians, two 
positions which would become major points of contention.149 However, the Platform’s 
position that legal oversight and interpretation of shari’a should be handed to a council of 
religious scholars was arguably its most glaring controversy. While the Brotherhood had 
repeatedly stressed they viewed both society and their own political party as civil in nature, 
the stipulation of the religious council again triggered the fears of their critics, arguing that 
the Brotherhood, despite their liberal democratic language, still aimed for the establishment 
of  a religious state.150 Criticism also came from the Brotherhood’s reformists, interestingly 
alleging that a wholly different version of the Party Platform had been in the making earlier 
under general supervision of ‘Isam al-‘Aryan, a prominent reformist. After his incarceration 
in May 2007 by the government, Muhammad Mursi, a middle generation conservative, had 
taken his place, producing a very different result. 151 
 The conservative leadership’s failure to convince others of their commitment to 
democratic principles deepened with the Brotherhood’s internal elections from 2008-2010. To 
be sure, the Brotherhood had considerably ameliorated its internal democratic procedures 
through revisions of its charter in the past decades. In the 1990’s, internal processes were 
amended, including members of the Guidance Bureau and Shura Council, be elected by 
secret ballot, rather than being handpicked by influential members. Also, positions on both 
bodies would be limited to four-year terms.152 This clearly reflected the reformist influence 
within the Brothers’ ranks, but it was not limited to them only: in an unprecedented move, 
‘Aqif announced he would step down as General Guide at the end of his ‘term’, a position 
traditionally held for life.153 However, the tight security surveillance on Brotherhood activity 
seriously impeded holding fair elections; for example, the Shura Council hadn’t been able to 
convene since 1995.154 The older generation now exploited this situation by pushing ahead 
with elections, which were done in utmost secrecy, by collecting the votes at the homes of 
Shura Council members.155 This manner of conduct reflected the older generation’s approach 
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towards the movement in general. With the absence of any supervisory committee, the 
Guidance Bureau elections of 2009 resulted in a massive win for the older generation; even 
middle generation conservatives like Muhammad Habib complained about the irregularities 
surrounding the election.156 Likewise, in January 2010, Muhammad Badi’, a conservative 
da’wa-oriented veteran, was elected as the new General Guide, appointing equally 
conservative deputies at his side.157 At the start of the new decade, conservative older and 
middle generation leaders had “a virtual monopoly over the Brotherhood’s executive 
branch.”158 
2010 parliamentary elections: an uprising in sight  
Meanwhile, the political oppositional forces that had emerged since the 2000’s were again 
gaining steam in the latter half on the decade. Massive protests resurged following Egypt’s 
cooperation in the 2007 Gaza blockade, and on April 6th, 2008, textile workers went on strike 
in Mahalla al-Kubra, resulting in the formation of the April 6th movement, which would 
become instrumental in the 2011 uprising.159 Most prominent, however, was the formation of 
the National Association for Change (NAC), led my Nobel laureate Muhammad al-Barada’i, 
former head of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency. Al-Barada’i adopted a defiant 
oppositional discourse, telling the regime in August 2010 to “pack your bags and go.”160 
Barada’i succeeded in gathering many oppositional movements and parties under his wing, 
uniting in a boycott of the 2010 parliamentary elections. But as the biggest oppositional force, 
the Brotherhood was reluctant to participate in the boycott. Still having 88 members in 
parliament, it had much to lose of a boycott, and thus awkwardly had a stake in the existing 
political situation.161 On the other hand, it fully supported al-Barada’i’s calls for reform. The 
debate within the Brotherhood also raged on the ideational level, with reformist leader al-
‘Aryan opting against the boycott, arguing that “the lesson is not to be absent (…) When we 
participate [in elections], the regime has to face us.”162 In the end, the Guidance Bureau 
decided to participate in the elections, but a number of members publicly distanced itself 
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from the decision and joined the boycott, highlighting the internal divisions within the 
movement.163 
 In the end, the elections proved a total sham. Security forces blocked voters from 
entering polling stations on numerous occasions, reportedly assaulted and arrested 
opposition candidates and many of their supporters, and government officials indulged in 
excessive rigging of the results. After the first round, Brotherhood candidates were officially 
predicted to win zero seats, after which the Brotherhood pulled out of the elections 
altogether in protest.164 At last, the Brotherhood’s leadership swung to the side of the NAC, 
eager to not miss the boat of the growing oppositional tide. But the elections revealed two 
important feats. First, the Guidance Bureau’s decision to participate in politics showed that 
the conservatives, once firmly in control, were still committed to political participation. 
Second, the Brotherhood revealed itself to be strongly divided internally, changing its 
course, and alliances, at the last minute.  
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3. The Post-Mubarak Years 
The Brotherhood’s position in and after the uprising 
The Brotherhood’s role in the popular uprisings in Egypt in January and February 2011 
proved influential yet controversial. First, the Brothers were apprehensive: while a collection 
of youth groups and oppositional parties were planning a march for January 25, annually 
celebrated as “Police Day” in Egypt,165 the Brotherhood opted to stay out, fearing immediate 
government reprisals.166 A segment of the Brotherhood’s youth, however, was adamant in 
participating and eventually got permission to do so from the leadership. 167 When the 
January 25 protests turned out to be a sweeping success, the Brotherhood quickly changed its 
mind and joined protests on January 28, dubbed the “Friday of Rage.168  The lost momentum 
was quickly made up for, and by the end of the first week of February, the Brotherhood was 
the dominant force on the street, demonstrated by the speaker platforms and sound towers it 
had set up at Tahrir Sqaure, and controlled.169  
 Over the next few weeks, the Muslim Brotherhood saw the balance of power in Egypt 
shift dramatically in their favour, thanks largely to the Egyptian army. Feeling increasingly 
side-lined by Mubarak over the decades, 170 its leadership denied Mubaraks request to use 
force against protestors. Instead, protestors were told the army deemed their demands 
“legitimate” and “would not use force against them.”171 When Mubarak at last resigned from 
the presidency on February 11th, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself to be the only 
broad-based, well organized popular movement in the country, with the army as the only 
serious contender for power. Thus, Brotherhood leaders reasoned it was best to keep its 
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traditional foe on the friendly side for the time being. When the army put its controversial 
“Constitutional Declaration” to popular referendum in March 2011, the Brotherhood 
mobilized its support to vote ‘yes’.172 In turn, the army released Brotherhood leaders like 
Khayrat al-Shatir from prison.173 
 The 18-day uprising and its stunning result triggered new stirs within Brotherhood 
ranks. Reformist youth segments, being the Brotherhood’s first representation in the 
uprising, as well as middle-generation reformists, felt the time had come for the Brotherhood 
to internally reform. Aiming to curb the Guidance Bureau’s power over the movement, 
reformists called for increased independence of the Shura Council, as well as publishing 
clear procedures for decision-making.174 However, these calls were the last stand of the 
increasingly marginalized reformist wing. The conservative leadership was firmly in control 
of the movement’s dealings down to its grassroots activities, including the recruitment of its 
new members.175 Leading the movement in traditional fashion, Brotherhood leaders were not 
prepared to reform. Indeed, the Guidance Bureau had already single-handedly announced 
the formation of a Brotherhood political party called “Freedom and Justice”, on February 
21,176 whilst forbidding members to join or start other political parties.177 Ultimately, the gulf 
could not be bridged, and most reformist leaders either quit or were expelled from the 
Brotherhood, many going on to form political parties of their own.178 Having restored order 
to their authority, the Brotherhood leadership went ahead planning for events to come.  
The Nahda Project: Khairat al-Shatir’s vision 
The leadership’s future plans all converged in the one word that engulfed the Brotherhood’s 
attention after Mubarak had been brought down: “Nahda”. The concept of nahda, meaning 
‘renaissance’ or ‘revival’ was probably borrowed from traditional Islamist vocabulary, but in 
the context of recent events, nahda gained a whole new meaning for the Brotherhood. Now 
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that Mubarak, which had always formed a barrier for the Brotherhood’s development, was 
gone, the way was clear for the Brotherhood to  revive its own development and that of 
Egypt.  
 So what did the Nahda Project look like in practice? The Brotherhood leaders were 
slow to reveal the actual contents of the project. In fact, the project had still to be set up after 
Mubarak’s downfall. To this end, Khayrat al-Shatir, who was emerging as the leading figure 
behind the project, opened up a page on his personal website, inviting Brotherhood members 
to “share their thoughts” concerning the internal development of the Brotherhood.179 
However, while touring the country in a series of lectures, named “Features of Nahda: Gains 
of the Revolution and the Horizons for Developing”180, al-Shatir made it clear that the overall 
framework of the Nahda Project was already decided upon. The lecture he gave before a 
crowd of fellow Brothers in Alexandria on April 21, 2011, not only reveals this overall 
framework, but also offers an insight into the rationale of the conservative leadership.  
 Al-Shatir starts with the core message of his lecture: the Jama’a is the primary 
instrument for reaching the Muslim Brother’s goals. He asserts that the overall mission of the 
Brotherhood, which is “to empower God’s religion on Earth, to organize our life and the 
lives of people on the basis of Islam”181, can only be achieved by a strong organization and 
structure.182 That structure, al-Shatir highlights, “needs to be obeyed and committed to”.183 
Al-Shatir then excessively elaborates on the work of the older generation leaders in setting 
up the “structure” of the Brotherhood after the crackdowns of President al-Nasir in 1954, as 
well as the hardships endured under Mubarak,184 pointing out to younger members, who 
“didn’t feel the efforts and hardships endured by the Ikhwan [Brothers] in this period”185, 
that they owed the Jama’a to their leaders.  
 Furthermore, al-Shatir points out that the Jama’a is not and cannot be the same as a 
political party. This is because “the political process (…) is only one part of the greater 
Nahda project”, encompassing “politics, economy, society, education, morals, values…”, 
                                 
179 Ikhwanweb, “Al-Shater’s website calls on MB members to share their thoughts,” Ikhwanweb.com 
March 30, 2011. 
180 Hudson Institute, “Translation: Khairat al-Shater”, 128 
181 Ibid., 129 
182 Ibid., 130. 
183 Ibid., 131 
184 Ibid., 138-141, 145-146. 
185 Ibid., 142 
41 
 
adding that “The Gama’a may establish a party”186. According to al-Shatir, a Brotherhood 
political party is merely the political offshoot of the Jama’a, and can never supersede it, 
because “the Gama’a is to remain the instrument which establishes an entire life for the 
Ummah on the basis of Islamic reference…”187. Interesting is al-Shatir’s use of umma, which 
straddles the overlapping meanings ‘Muslim community’ and ‘Nation’. As such, al-Shatir 
envisions the Jama’a of the Brotherhood as the instrument through which to reform either the 
Muslim community or the nation, or both.   
 Not only does al-Shatir portray the Jama’a as the primary instrument, but also as a 
concept that has been unchanged throughout the Brotherhood’s history. Al-Shatir constantly 
repeats his assertion that it was Hassan al-Banna’ that founded the Jama’a as the main 
method of the Brotherhood, and that the Brotherhood has since held on to that method. That  
is why “the method of the Muslim Brotherhood (…) is not open to developing or change.”188 
Interestingly, al-Shatir goes on to show that al-Banna’ adopted the concept of Jama’a by 
studying the Prophet Muhammad. For this he takes his fellow Brothers through Islamic 
history. He describes how Islamic systems of government, law and economy were replaced  
by Europeans who colonized Islamic countries, and how various thinkers attempted to 
reform Islam.189 What al-Banna’ understood and all other Muslim reformers did not, al-Shatir 
argues, is that in order to build society on the basis of Islam, Muslims need to be organized 
in one body. Al-Banna’ found the Prophet Muhammad to be in a historically analogous 
position, because the Prophet built up an Islamic system of organization in an 
unaccommodating environment.190 In constructing this particular historical context, al-Shatir 
does two things. First, he depicts al-Banna’ as the first person since the Prophet who realized 
that Muslim societies need an overarching structure in order to enforce Islamic primacy in 
society. Second, he links this method to the Prophet Muhammad, leading al-Shatir to the 
following conclusion: “Therefore, my brothers, the Muslim Brotherhood’s method is that of 
the Prophet (…) and thus we say that the Muslim who is connected to the Gama’a… is on the 
right path and that the must not be on a path other than this one.”191 In sum, not only is the 
method of Jama’a not open to change, but it is the only right path for any Muslim.  
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In describing the Brotherhood’s overall mission, al-Shatir also points out the stages al-
Banna’ introduced:192 “Thus we’ve learned building [1.] the Muslim individual, [2.] the 
Muslim family, [3.] the Muslim society, [4.] the Islamic government, [5.] the global Islamic 
State and [6.] reaching the status of Ustathiya with that state.”193 Interestingly, he also points 
out the stage the Brotherhood has reached: “we are at the stage of society and about to be in 
the stage [of] government.”194 According to al-Shatir, the uprising that toppled Mubarak put 
the Muslim Brotherhood on the brink of reaching the fourth stage, that of attaining an 
Islamic government. Al-Shatir elaborates on what Islamic government means, and what it 
doesn’t mean: “Our preparation for the stage of Islamic government does not, as the 
secularists call it, entail us striving to reach the seat of government ourselves.”195 In this 
sense, al-Shatir portrays the Brotherhood not as a political organization, but as a pressure 
group, content with simply establishing the foundations of Islamic government: “Our one 
and only concern is for there to be a government that is faithful to the method of our Lord 
Almighty, and a government keen on establishing the lives of people on the basis of Islamic 
reference, 
whether it be us or someone else.”196 Thus al-Shatir highlights what he believes to be the 
basis of an Islamic government: a government that commits itself to the first stage of al-
Banna’s plan, namely to Islamize the lives of Muslim individuals; a government whose 
primary goal is to empower God’s will in the lives of people.  
 Further, al-Shatir stresses that in the political realm, the practices of shura and ijtihad 
must be adhered to at all times: “all the decision-making mechanisms inside the Muslim 
society become based on Shura, and … also that the choices of officials and representatives at 
the various levels should be based on Shura.”197 Clearly, al-Shatir follows the line of the 
Brotherhood’s endorsement for democracy based on the concept of shura. On the issue of 
who can execute shura and ijtihad, al-Shatir is a bit vaguer. He stresses that it is “the Ummah 
itself”, or at least “the council (parliament) which represents it”.198 However, the practice of 
shura and ijtihad are traditionally reserved for scholars in Islamic law. Does this mean that 
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parliament can only be filled with law scholars, or is any member of the umma eligible to 
interpret Islamic law in parliament? This is left unspoken by al-Shatir.   
 
Al-Shatir’s nahda lecture is compelling because the language and framing is so different than 
in most other public documents or statements produced by the Muslim Brotherhood, and it 
is important because of its timing. The difference of al-Shatir’s lecture lies mostly in its 
audience. In front of Muslim Brotherhood members, al-Shatir adopts a fully religious 
framework, framing the efforts of the Brotherhood as executing God’s will on earth. 
Moreover, al-Shatir frames the mission and method of the MB as unchanged since al-Banna’ 
and connects al-Banna’ with the Prophet Muhammad, thus framing the Nahda project as a 
continuation of the work of the Prophet himself.  Additionally, al-Shatir constantly conflates 
the Muslim Brotherhood and its Jama’a with the Egyptian nation, mostly through his 
adoption of the word umma and its double meaning. While constantly reiterating that it is the 
“Ummah’s Nahda”, he also states that the Jama’a is the only workable method for any 
Muslim. Al-Shatir further on attempts to separate the two saying that “we don’t mean that 
the Muslim Brothers are the Ummah’s representatives in the developing the Nahda Project, 
but rather that they think, plan, spread awareness and market the idea”, but these actions 
arguably come very close to being a representative. It shows that al-Shatir, and the 
conservative leadership with him, can only perceive Egypt’s development through the 
structure of the Jama’a. Having built and defended this structure for decades, they cannot 
think outside this framework.   
Most importantly, however, al-Shatir addresses a crowd of Brothers who have 
recently witnessed the extraordinary toppling of a well-entrenched ruler and his security 
apparatus, as well as the heated discussions within the Brotherhood leading to the exit of 
some well-known middle-generation and young reformist leaders. By highlighting the 
centrality of the Jama’a and its connections to al-Banna’ and the Prophet, the lecture is 
designed to restate the authority of the leadership over its members. It is as though al-Shatir 
wants to say: ‘youngsters, don’t get exited now or think you know better. Follow your 
leaders, because they know what to do.’ Framing the Jama’a as the cornerstone of Islamic 
revival and development, even as the supreme organizational unit of Islam itself, al-Shatir 
attempts to close the Brotherhood’s ranks and keep its organization intact.   
  Tellingly, however, a very different message is conveyed to the outside world. 
Reporting on al-Shatir’s lecture, Ikhwanweb, the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English 
website, states that “Al-Shater explained that the group’s main objective is to peacefully 
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establish a civil state based on Islamic references” and that “Al-Shater called on Muslim 
scholars to propose a comprehensive platform which would help establish such a civil and 
progressive state.”199 This is immediately followed by: “[al-Shatir] stated that the 
Brotherhood's vigour is drawn from its moral and organizational elements stressing the MB 
depends on its Shura Council in all its affairs.”200 By highlighting the ‘civil’ and ‘progressive’ 
nature of al-Shatir’s call, words he had not used even once during the lecture, and by 
stressing the Brotherhood’s commitment to shura (and thus democracy), the Brotherhood 
shows itself very anxious to frame al-Shatir’s lecture in a way they deem acceptable for the 
outside world, which was not all what al-Shatir’s lecture was about.  
The FJP and its Party Program 
Thanks in part to the efforts of public strongmen like al-Shatir, the Brotherhood could restore 
order within the Brotherhood ranks and focus on preparing for the parliamentary elections, 
which were held from November 2011 to January 2012. To be sure, the Brotherhood already 
had plans in store before Mubarak was brought down, as exemplified by the Brotherhood 
announcing the establishment of its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) just days after 
Mubarak’s resignation”.201 On April 30, 2011, the Brotherhood’s Shura Council decided that 
Muhammad Mursi would become the party’s president, ‘Isam al-‘Aryan vice-president and 
Sa’ad al-Katatni secretary general, all three members of the Guidance Bureau, posts that the 
three would consequently relinquish.202 Much like in the Mubarak era, the Brotherhood 
played down fears that it was seeking to dominate Egyptian politics. ‘Isam al-‘Aryan, at the 
FJP’s first public conference on June 10, assured that the FJP would “not seek to acquire a 
majority in the parliament alone, but rather to harvest 30 or 35% of the seats” and that it was 
“willing to form an alliance with the political forces that agree to our principles; whether 
they are socialists, liberals or other Islamic forces…”.203 
 From the outset, the FJP portrayed itself as a party representing all Egyptians, and 
would thus run its affairs independent of the Brotherhood. For example, Brotherhood 
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leaders pointed out that the FJP was “approved by 100 Copts and has 1000 female members 
amongst the party’s founders”204, and Sa’ad al-Katatni stressed that the FJP would not be 
subservient to the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau.205 However, this notion runs counter to 
al-Shatir’s point made in the Alexandria speech that the party is simply a part of the Jama’a. 
Also, reformists pointed out that it was the Guidance Bureau deciding to establish the FJP, 
not the Shura Council, and that the Shura Council had chosen the FJP’s leaders before FJP 
members themselves could decide on this issue.206 Muhammad Mursi’s later statement of the 
issue, stating that “the group [being the Brotherhood] took the decision to set up this party, 
and thus the party represents the political wing of the group … the party remains 
independent to make its own political decisions and they don't necessarily have to be the 
same as those of the group”207, inadvertently confirms the Brotherhood’s strong interest and 
presence in the FJP.  
The FJP’s “Election Program”, released in the run-up for the parliamentary elections, 
employed a language that could not differ more from al-Shatir’s speech. Rather than being 
the political arm of the Jama’a, the FJP was portrayed as a result of the ‘Egyptian Revolution’ 
and being completely in the service of achieving “its goals of building a free, stable, strong, 
leading and advanced country”, aspired to by “all Egyptians”.208 Up front it was stated that 
the FJP was “representing all segments of the Egyptian people” including “Egyptian 
women”209, whilst staying silent on the party’s origins. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
only named once in the program, listing its merits in parliament from 2005 to 2010.210 The FJP 
presented its political program as built on “four fundamental principles”:  
 
“- Building a strong democratic political system that safeguards the citizens’ rights 
and freedoms, applies the principle of Shura (consultation), and builds an 
institutional state where the rule of the law is the title of civilized modern human 
life.  
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- Achieving social justice that will preserve the citizens‟ dignity, safeguard their 
rights and provide a decent life for all, irrespective of class, status or affiliation… 
 
- Laying the foundation for real integrated development and progress of Egypt, 
our beloved homeland, with all its human and economic resources, its production 
and construction...  
  
- Restoring the leadership which Egypt has long since lost under rule of the former 
regime on all Arab, African, Islamic, international, scientific, cultural, and media 
levels…”211 
 
These principles are summarized in the terms “Freedom … Justice … Development … 
Leadership”, which the FJP claims “represent the great purposes of Sharia”.212 Before 
addressing the principles in detail, the program stresses three “Urgent Issues”. The first is 
reforming Egypt’s security system. According to the FJP, Egypt is haunted by a “lack of 
security”, standing “in the way of achieving the goals of revolution”213 The second addresses 
the economy. Listing a number of mostly internal problems, the urgent task is to “restore 
confidence in the Egyptian economy”.214 The third is fighting corruption, the effort of which 
is headed by “Establishing an independent, strong and fair judiciary”.215 
 While elaborating on the first principle of their policy, the FJP took time to explain 
their vision of the nature of the state. The program unambiguously stated that the “people” 
are the source of authority: “That is real pluralism which safeguards the people’s freedom to 
hold executive powers to account”216. “This [principle],” the FJP goes on, “requires a new 
constitution, with enlightened principles of Sharia as its frame of reference and the source to 
its articles and the subsequent changes in the legal system.”217 Thus, while people are the 
source of “authority”, the shari’a is the source for the Constitution and (the changes to) the 
legal system. Interestingly, the FJP places the task of interpreting shari’a (ijtihad) in the hands 
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of “legislative councils”,218 without further elaborating on what these councils exactly are 
and what their relation is to other state institutions. On the topic of citizenship, the Program 
states that “the State is based on the principle of citizenship, where all citizens enjoy equal 
rights … in accordance with the principles of equality”219, adding that “FJP representatives 
seek to … Guarantee non-discrimination among citizens in right and duties on the basis of 
religion, sex or colour.”220 This is immediately followed up by “[FJP representatives seek to] 
Ensure women’s access to all their rights, consistent with the values of Islamic law, maintaining 
the balance between their duties and rights.”221 Furthermore, the Program stated that “The State 
is Democratic, based on the (Shura) consultation principles”, further explaining that “Shura is 
not merely a political principle” but rather “a moral guide for the behaviour of individuals 
and their social relations”222. Also the FJP reiterated the MB position that “The State is civil 
and civilian … It is not a military state … nor is it a theocracy … In fact, the rulers in the 
Islamic state are citizens elected according to the will of the people.” 
 On the topic of state institutions and distribution of power, the Election Program has 
been more eloquent than previous Brotherhood documents, albeit not presenting anything 
new. The FJP states that “The State is a constitutional one based on three pillars: the 
legislature, the judiciary and the executive authority”, calling for the “distribution of 
responsibilities and authority” enforced by constitutional law223. According to the program, 
such as system starts with an independent judiciary, as the FJP seeks to rid the judiciary of its 
Mubarak-era corruptive impulses by “separating the powers of investigation and 
prosecution”, “Abolishing the President’s power as head of the Supreme Judicial Council” 
and “prohibiting assignment … of judges to positions in ministries and executive branch 
authorities”.224 Outside the judiciary, the FJP calls for placing all “regulatory institutions and 
bodies” under the authority of parliament rather than “the executive branch”, and for local 
bureaucracies to be impartial to political preference, its civil servants selected on their 
competencies rather than connections.225  Perhaps most conspicuously is the FJP’s call for 
stripping the President from its executive power, handing it to the Prime Minister. However, 
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the President should retain its executive role “in this transitional period”, without stipulating 
when that period would be over.226   
In sum, on the topic of the nature of the state, The FJP Election Program seemed to 
follow the lines of earlier Muslim Brotherhood positions and all the controversies that go 
with them. The tension between the people and Sharia as the source of authority; the friction 
between the straightforward claim of equal rights for all citizens based on the principle of 
equality, yet placing women’s rights in the framework of “the values of Islamic law”; the 
vagueness on the issue of who has the right to interpret shari’a; all of these issues seemed to 
be reproduced in the FJP Election Program. To be sure, as Khalil al-Anani argues, the major 
points of controversy surrounding the Brotherhood’s 2007 Draft Party Platform were now 
either watered down or omitted. The notion that Christians or women could not become 
President was left out of the FJP Election Program; the issue of trusting ijtihad to a council of 
religious scholars, sparking strong reactions from outsiders in 2007, was now rephrased to 
“be entrusted to legislative councils”. It seems that the FJP was keen on promoting its 
political program while trying to avoid too much criticism.227 
 What really stands out in the FJP Election Program, however, is the comprehensive 
prioritization of liberal, non-religious vocabulary over Islamic notions. Throughout the 
Program, there is a recurring pattern of how messages are structured. The FJP presents its 
fundamental principles as Freedom, Justice, Development and Leadership, with the most 
liberal principle up front, which is then casually followed by ‘these principles represent 
shari’a’; similarly, the State “is” democratic, while being “based on” shura; the Program 
asserts that freedom, fundamental rights and equality are absolute priorities for the FJP, 
followed by saying these are “one of the greatest objectives of Sharia”.228 Even when 
elaborating on “Leadership”, evoking the Islamist principle of Ustadhiya, the sequence is 
“First, Political Leadership”, “Second, Cultural and Media Leadership”, with “Religious 
Leadership” discussed as the last segment under Culture and Media.229  By staging liberal, 
non-religious issues up front, the FJP seems eager to show itself as the champion of 
liberalism, democracy and development rather than the champion of Islam, appealing to the 
non-Islamist segment of society. By including the Islamic sources of inspiration, the FJP 
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reassures its Islamist constituency in general, and the Brotherhood support base in 
particular, of its commitment to Islam, but the Islamist message clearly comes in second 
place. The contrast with al-Shatir’s speech could not have been greater.  
 
However, that contrast did not result in loss of votes. The FJP won parliamentary elections 
with 37,5% of the vote, worth around 44% of the seats in parliament.230 Equally stunning was 
the runner-up’s result: the Islamic Alliance, a Salafi coalition led by the al-Nur party, gained 
25% of seats.231 The performance of the Salafi parties, born out of the social movement The 
Salafi Call, was particularly striking because they were complete political novices, being 
inspired to organize only after the March 2011 referendum on the Constitutional 
Declaration.232 Adopting straightforward Islamist goals as well as rhetoric, they had the 
potential to become an uncomfortable and embarrassing challenge to the Brotherhood’s 
Islamist credentials.  
 However, the SCAF had been anticipating these results. Following the election 
results, the SCAF stated that only the president had the right to form a government, based on 
(its interpretation of) the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration.233 If it wanted to wield 
executive power, the Brotherhood had to break their promise of not fielding a presidential 
candidate. After heated debates, the Shura Council narrowly voted to field a candidate, in 
the person of Khayrat al-Shatir.234 However, al-Shatir was disqualified due to a law banning 
recently released convicts from entering the presidential race.235 Swallowing the decision, the 
FJP fielded Muhammad Mursi instead.  
The Nahda Project: a worked-out plan? 
Meanwhile, the FJP Party Program had been remarkable in another aspect: it did not 
mention the Nahda Project at all. Indeed, the Brotherhood did not publicly mention the 
project of Nahda until the beginning of the presidential election campaign in April 2012. 
Even in the Brotherhood’s reporting of al-Shatir’s nahda lecture in April 2011, the 
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Brotherhood failed to mention the Nahda Project entirely.236 This also meant that a worked-
out version of the Nahda Project would take at least another year to materialize. The 
newspaper al-Ahram reported in May 2012 that the Nahda Project “was finally published as 
a hard copy” on April 28, 2012, but that it “extends to just eleven pages.”237 Although I could 
not retrieve this particular document, the Brotherhood’s website Ikhwanweb published a 
“translation of [Muhammad Mursi’s] electoral program: the Nahda Project.”, on April 28th, 
2012,238 thus equating Mursi’s presidential program to the nahda.  
 What does Mursi’s electoral program add to the Nahda project? First, Mursi takes 
time to outline a number of principles for the Nahda, which reflect a mixture of liberal and 
Islamist language. The Nahda is about  
 
“… empowering the people and placing their destinies in their own hands … 
bringing forth Egyptian individuals who feel at peace with themselves, their 
family, work, environment and society at large … a society that occupies its 
rightful ranking among the world’s nations … protect[ing] their rights and dignity 
within and outside the country.”239 
 
He then states that “We are fully aware that the rejuvenation of a nation cannot be achieved 
by any single party, sector, group or trend … the way to the desired real renaissance is our 
unity of ranks and determination to achieve comprehensive revitalization”.240 Again, Mursi 
applies an interesting vocabulary mixture, trying to place a pluralist discourse (‘the Nahda 
can only be realized together’) in the spirit of the Jama’a (‘the real Nahda is our “unity of 
ranks” and determination’). Mursi concludes the introduction with “we present to you the 
following features of the Egyptian Nahda Project with hope that Egyptians of all segments of 
society will contribute to its evaluation, discussion, and formation”,241 presenting the Nahda 
Project as not finalized, thus highlighting its pluralist nature. 
 Mursi’s main contribution to the Nahda Project is that he determines three stages 
through which the nahda is to be implemented. The first is the “Value and Thought level”, 
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which “describes what Egyptians want or wish for in their daily lives, in terms of values, 
rights, qualities, and duties”.242 Thus, Mursi employs al-Banna’s first stage of ‘building the 
Muslim individual’ in a national democratic context (‘what do Egyptians want?’).  The 
second is the “Strategy level”, which “comprises seven paths aiming to achieve the desired 
change through complex development plans”.243 The third is “The Executive level”, which 
“transforms these [complex development] plans into specific groups of projects, reforms, and 
operational policies”.244 Strikingly, the remainder of Mursi’s electoral program elaborates 
exclusively on the seven paths of the Strategic level, saying that “Under each [path] are a 
number of projects and executive programs, some of which have entered the implementation 
phase and others are still under preparation”,245 thus implying that the phase of asking 
Egyptians what they want has already passed, and that some paths are ready to enter the 
Executive level. The paths themselves roughly reflect the spearheads of the FJP Party 
Program, focusing on “the political system”, “a developmental economy”, “Societal 
empowerment”, “human resource development”, the “security system” and “regional and 
international leadership”, which are being elaborated on following the lines of the FJP Party 
Program.246 Concerning the nature of the state, Mursi stresses the constitutionality of the 
state, where power is distributed among institutions upheld by the constitution, also naming 
its transparency and accessibility for all Egyptians.247 
 Thus, Mursi’s electoral Nahda Program follows the lines of the FJP Program, while 
employing a similar discourse, in contrast to al-Shatir’s Nahda lecture. Perhaps most 
interesting is Mursi’s attempt to walk the line between the FJP’s leadership over the Nahda 
Project and its pluralist character, attempting to present a stable, established project while 
simultaneously inviting Egyptians to evaluate, discuss and help form the project. Also, Mursi 
employs the same method of placing Islamist concepts in a liberal democratic context, 
whereby the latter leads the overall language employed.  
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The Battle over the Constitution 
The Constitution of Egypt, which was rewritten in 2012 and presented to popular 
referendum on December 15th and 22nd of that year248, was arguably the most important 
document that political groups wanted to participate in writing, as it would lay down the 
parameters for a new Egypt in the most permanent manner possible.  Possibly, the document 
was even more important for the Brotherhood. Over the years, its leaders had repeatedly 
stated they aimed for an Islamic form of governance in Egypt, regardless of who would be 
governing the country. In this line of thought, the Constitution would be the most important 
link to establishing such a structure. However, the Brothers were not alone, as other sides 
vied for space and influence in writing the Constitution. Obviously, the 2012 Constitution 
cannot be simply read as a Brotherhood document, even though its influence was great. To 
understand the Brothers’ influence on its final draft, we must first look at the forces that 
shaped the writing process of the 2012 Constitution. 
 The Constitution was to be written by a special body called the Constituent Assembly 
(CA), a 100-member body whose occupants were to be chosen by the new parliament.249 
Following their electoral victory, winning roughly 44% of parliamentary seats, the FJP 
moved to dominate leadership positions. For instance, twelve of the nineteen parliamentary 
committees were headed by FJP members.250 Additionally, the Salafi al-Nur party, the 
second biggest party in parliament, went on to control three committees, giving Islamist 
parties a near 80% lead over parliamentary committees.251 The Islamist trend was thus set 
before filling the Constituent Assembly’s positions. Its seats would be divided 50-50 between 
parliamentarians on the one hand and law experts and civil groups’ representatives on the 
other, and in the end Islamist parties occupied 66 seats.252 This show of strength triggered 
heavy protests from non-Islamist parties, fearing the Constitution would become an Islamist 
document.  By the time the CA had its first session on March 28, 2012, nearly one third of its 
members had boycotted the body.253 However, the Islamist display of power soon proved to 
be fatal for the CA itself: after liberals handed in legal objections to the Supreme 
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Constitutional Court (SCC) against the CA, the SCC ruled that the CA was indeed 
“insufficiently representative”, 254 and dissolved the body altogether. These events instilled 
mutual fears that started to antagonize different sides. Liberals and other non-Islamists felt 
the Brotherhood was seeking to dominate Egyptian politics; the Brotherhood, for their part, 
felt they were being blocked by what they saw as the “deep state”255 of the old regime, as 
represented in the SCC and the SCAF.  
 The CA’s dissolution proved only the beginning of a months-long political struggle. 
On June 14, 2012, the SCC ordered the dissolution of parliament itself. The SCC argued that, 
with parliament being elected on both party and individual ballots, party members had been 
able to run on the individual ballot as well, thus rendering the parliamentary elections 
unconstitutional.256 In reaction, the SCAF immediately enforced the SCC’s ruling by closing 
off the parliamentary building.257 While the SCC’s move was legally sound, its timing (just 
two days before the last round of the presidential elections) and the SCAF’s reaction fuelled 
Brotherhood suspicions that the ancièn regime was actively working against it. This fear was 
compounded when three days later, just before Mursi would emerge victoriously from 
elections, the SCAF announced another Constitutional Declaration, in which it handed itself 
legislative powers in the absence of parliament as well as the right to appoint a new CA 
should the current one fail to deliver.258  
 Indeed, after the SCC had dissolved the CA, parliament had worked hard to set up a 
new CA, the FJP perhaps sensing time was not on parliament’s side. This time, it was agreed 
that the CA would be divided 50-50 among Islamists and non-Islamists.259 However, 
Islamists managed to get some al-Azhar scholars and other independents elected into the CA 
on their side, therefore still constituting a narrow majority of 57.260 That majority grew 
bigger, because some non-Islamists again boycotted the CA. SCC representatives also pulled 
out, but stopped short of dissolving the new CA altogether.261 In the end, parliament voted 
the new CA into existence on June 12, 2012, just two days before parliament would be 
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dissolved. Thus, when Muhammad Mursi was declared president with a narrow 51.7% of 
the votes on June 24, 2012, his powers greatly decreased by the SCAF declaration a week 
earlier, the only governmental body under FJP leadership left was the CA. Wary of SCC and 
SCAF intrusion and eager to imprint Brotherhood visions on the Constitution, Mursi spurred 
the body on to produce a first draft as soon as possible.   
However, the Brotherhood would find unexpected opposition in the Salafi 
contingent. Being positioned between non-Islamists and the Salafis, FJP representatives 
hoped to steer the different sides to a Brotherhood-inspired compromise, but the Salafis 
pushed the Brotherhood to get their way in a number of key issues. The Salafis demanded 
Article 2 of the Constitution, stating the source of law in Egypt, to be the rulings (ahkam) of 
shari’a, or just shari’a, instead of the somewhat vague “principles” of shari’a.262 Also, Salafis 
pushed for “democracy” to be simply supplanted with “Shura”, “people” with “God” as the 
source of authority, and sought to place absolute constitutional freedoms, such as the 
freedom of thought and religion, “within the premises of Sharia.”263 To pressure the 
Brotherhood, Salafis organized massive street protests using clear-cut Islamist language, 
seriously jeopardizing the Brotherhood’s Islamist credentials in the process.264 Increasingly 
under attack, the Brotherhood sought to rectify itself, especially its stance towards shari’a. In 
an elaborate statement released on October 31, 2012, the Brotherhood elaborates:  
 
“Sharia a comprehensive way of life that seeks to create good individuals and 
patriotic citizens who love their homeland, are faithful to their fellow nationals … 
Sharia further aims to create a cooperative, supportive society based on equality, 
justice and mutual respect, and the establishment of good governance that focuses 
on serving the people, achieving justice between citizens … Thus Sharia awakens 
faith, reforms behavior, improves the general environment of the whole society, 
and polishes morals … this civilized society [is] created by Sharia … Sharia is … 
putting public interest above the individual’s ... achieving balance between the 
rights of the individual and society … Above all, the system of Sharia totally rejects 
the concept of a theocracy … people are exclusively the source of the various 
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authorities; they freely choose or elect to create those authorities, according to 
Sharia principles, under no-one and no faction’s custodianship.”265 
 
In the face of Salafi pressure, the Brotherhood holds on to its known mixture of Islamist and 
liberal democratic language, with an extra jolt of nationalism. Interesting here is the subtle 
critique of the individual’s rights in western, “man-made” laws, stating shari’a puts “public 
interest above the individual’s”.266 Whilst probably being one of the most elaborate 
Brotherhood statements on shari’a to date, the language is strongly familiar. Most 
importantly, this statement shows that, even when challenged by another Islamist group to 
adopt straightforward Islamist language in public, the Brotherhood does not.  
 Judging from the final draft of the 2012 Constitution, Salafi victories seem few and far 
in between. By far the biggest struggle was fought over Article 2. The new Constitution 
stated that “The principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation”,267 
virtually equating the wording of the outgoing 1971 Constitution.268 The Salafis had not 
succeeded in getting their preference concerning this article. However, as compromise, they 
pushed for ‘principles of Islamic Sharia’ to be elaborated on in a separate article.269 Article 
219 stipulates that “The principles of Islamic Sharia include [1] general evidence, [2] 
foundational rules, [3] rules of jurisprudence, and [4] credible sources accepted in Sunni 
doctrines and by the larger community.”270 These four categories of shari’a principles derive 
from the scholarly tradition of Islamic law. The first represents the ahkam; the second relates 
to “overarching principles” that are “induced from a study of the scriptures”, such as 
“justice” or “utility”;271 the third relates to the methods of distilling law from the sources 
installed by the fiqh schools, as well as issues on which ijma’ (consensus) had been reached;272 
the fourth refers to the sources used, namely, the Qur’an, the Sunna and law commentaries 
                                 
265 Ikwanweb, “Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Islamic Law and National Identity”, 
Ikhwanweb.com, November 4, 2012.  
266 Ikwanweb, “Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Islamic Law” 
267 Constituent Assembly, “The New Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt”. 
Translation by International IDEA. Cairo, November 30, 2012, 3 
268 C. Dahl, “Comparing Egypt’s Constitutions” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
December 1, 2013, 5. 
269 Nathan Brown  and Clark Lombardi, “Islam in Egypt’s new Constitution” Foreign Policy, 
December 13, 2012, Tadros, “What is a Constitution Anyway?”, 14 
270 Constituent Assembly, “Constitution”, 49  
271 Brown and Lombardi, “Islam in Egypt’s new Constitution” 
272 Ibid.  
56 
 
by the fiqh schools. However, even the inclusion of Article 219 was hardly a Salafi victory, as 
the four categories mostly represented the methods of the scholarly tradition of fiqh, of which 
Salafis are very sceptical.273 Additionally, Article 4 stated that “Al-Azhar’s Council of Senior 
Scholars is to be consulted in matters relating to Islamic Sharia.”274 Rather than elevating this 
body of religious scholars to an authority on interpreting shari’a (as the Brotherhood’s 2007 
Draft Party Platform had suggested), it merely received a consulting role, whilst legislative 
and judicial powers were left firmly in the hands of parliament and the judiciary, 
respectively.275   
Also with other crunch issues, Salafis did not get their way. On the issue of political 
authority, the new document directly follows the 1971 Constitution. Article 5 stated that 
“Sovereignty is for the people alone and they are the source of authority.”276 In defining 
political principles, Article 6 employs typical Brotherhood vocabulary:   
 
The political system is based on the principles of democracy and consultation, 
citizenship (under which all citizens are equal in rights and public duties), political 
and multi-party pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, the separation and 
balance of powers, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms.277 
 
Concerning constitutional freedoms, the 2012 Constitution states “The freedom of thought 
and opinion is guaranteed”, “The freedom of belief is inviolable” and “The freedom of the 
press, printing, publication and mass media is guaranteed”,278 without confining these 
within the limits of shari’a. In similar vein, the Constitution “commits to ensuring safety, 
security and equal opportunity for all citizens without discrimination” in Article 9.279 
 To be sure, there were Islamist-inspired stipulations added to the 2012 Constitution 
other than Articles 4 and 219. For instance, according to Article 1, Egypt was part of the 
“Islamic nations”; the ban on religious political parties was removed; freedom of belief was 
restricted to the “divine religions”, being the three Abrahamic ones; Article 44 explicitly 
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prohibited blasphemy of prophets; Article 10, which had always stated “The family is the 
basis of society and is based on religion, morality and patriotism”, was now amended with 
“The state and society oversee the commitment to the genuine character of the Egyptian 
family”, giving organizations like the Brotherhood itself constitutional rights in this field.280 
Stunningly, however, the 1971 provision ensuring women’s equality “without violation of 
the rules of Islamic jurisprudence” (sounding a lot like the 2011 FJP Election Program) was 
simply omitted in the 2012 Constitution, having stated equal opportunities for all citizens 
“without discrimination” in Article 9.281 Therefore, the 2012 Constitution sounded even less 
Islamist than its 1971 predecessor on the issue of women.  
 In all, the 2012 Constitution, whilst being criticized by Samuel Tadros for being a 
‘complete Salafi victory’,282 wasn’t anything of the sort, nor was it even overtly Islamist. The 
biggest Islamist landmarks in 2012 Constitution, besides lifting the ban on religious parties, 
were the definition of shari’a in Article 219 and the consultative role for al-Azhar in shari’a 
matters in Article 4. However, these additions did not alter the balance of power in the 
constitutional sense, because parliament and the judiciary had retained their legislative and 
judiciary powers, respectively. Whether shari’a would become an important legal source in 
post-Mubarak Egypt, would be decided by the occupants of parliament and the judiciary, 
rather than the Constitution. 
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Conclusion 
The discursive practices of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and the ideological elements 
weaved within them, show themselves to be created from a plethora of different forces. At 
the historical base of the movement, Hassan al-Banna’ already leaves much space open to 
future interpretation when delegating issues of a political nature to the realm of ijtihad. In 
contrast, he leaves decidedly less doubt on how the Jama’a should be organized and run. In 
the 1980’s, the work and vision of ‘Umar al-Tilmisani are critical for the Brothers’ orientation 
towards liberal democratic ideals and political participation in a secular national framework. 
Brotherhood leaders now started to vocally support liberal democratic values and concepts 
such as individual freedom, popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and political pluralism. 
Also, many Brotherhood leaders, particularly from the “middle generation”, gained political 
and administrative skills within civil institutions, such as the parliament and the professional 
syndicates.   
However, it is doubtful whether the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole had intrinsically 
adopted liberal democratic values up to this point. For sure, the adoption of a liberal 
democratic framework was used pragmatically by the Brotherhood to increase political 
gains. However, rather than this being a cynical façade, liberal democratic values were 
colliding with Islamist ones in earnest within Brotherhood ranks, creating two long-term 
effects. First, the intermingling of liberal democratic and Islamist values created many 
ambiguities. Exemplified by the publication of their Draft Party Platform in 2007, the Muslim 
Brothers remained fundamentally ambiguous concerning the nature of the state (religious or 
secular?), the ultimate source of authority (people or God?), the role of shari’a as the source of 
law, and citizenship. Second, a gradual rift developed between reformist and conservative 
strands in the middle generation.  While the reformist camp generally pushed a full intrinsic 
adoption of liberal democratic values, the “conservative pragmatics” stopped short of this 
adoption, opining that divine authority as expressed in Islamic texts has ultimate authority 
in all aspects of life. This opinion was supported by the older generation, rooted in da’wa-
oriented activities.  
Ultimately, the conservative pragmatics would become key Brotherhood leaders from 
2000 onwards and into the post-Mubarak era. Perhaps, leaders as Khayrat al-Shatir, Sa’ad al-
Katatni, Muhammad al-Biltagi, Muhammad Mursi and also ‘Isam al-‘Aryan best reflected 
the Brotherhood’s development up to that point. Being politically astute, pragmatically 
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inclined, and fully embracing the Brotherhood’s discursive and ideological elements, 
including its ambiguities, they were in the perfect position to lead the Brotherhood to the 
future, whilst preserving the older generation’s traditional view of the Jama’a. 
Simultaneously, the subsequent government crackdowns in 1995 and 2005 helped preserve 
the hierarchal and secretive character of the Brotherhood’s internal dealings, impeding 
democratic reform from within.  
Analysing the Brotherhood’s discursive products from the post-Mubarak years, the 
main trends created in the Mubarak years are clearly visible. Al-Shatir’s Nahda lecture in 
particular highlights the leadership of the conservative strand in the Brotherhood, and the 
frame of thinking it was immersed in. Faced with upheaval in Egyptian society and within 
Muslim Brotherhood ranks, he reinvigorated the most conservative framework possible; 
presenting the Jama’a as the unchanged building block of the Brotherhood, while linking its 
foundations to the Prophet Muhammad himself. The stress on the conservative and 
organizational elements of the movement would keep the Brotherhood together, as it had 
done in the past. By stark contrast, the FJP Election Program was written completely in a 
liberal democratic framework, with notions of freedom, equality and democracy dominating 
the view and Islamist notions of shari’a and shura in mere servitude of the former. The 
Election Program clearly stands in a tradition of the Brotherhood’s liberal democratic 
discourse, employed when the movement had to present itself to society as a whole. A 
striking similarity between the two documents, however, is the hesitance to clarify who 
should interpret shari’a, which is undoubtedly the key issue in shaping an Islamic 
government. Thus, whether adopting a clear-cut Islamist or a decidedly liberal democratic 
framework, the Brothers stay clear of determining the concrete role of shari’a in state and 
society. 
After winning parliamentary and presidential elections, the Brotherhood could lay 
their hands on a historic prize, reaching its long-term goal of writing the Constitution itself. 
The 2012 Constitution adopts a predominantly liberal democratic discourse despite Salafi 
Islamists being the biggest group in the Constituent Assembly after the FJP. The 2012 
Constitution did result in some Islamist victories, but again, the crunch issue of the role of 
shari’a in shaping governance was left undecided. While the ban on religious parties was 
abolished and criticizing religious prophets was banned, shari’a remained the rather vague 
“principal source of legislation”, with al-Azhar, a classic representative of fiqh tradition, 
placed in a mere consultative role. The status of citizenship, while presented as being simply 
rooted in liberal democratic principles, still remained vague by determining the family as the 
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basis of society and placing it under state and societal oversight. Thus, even in the 2012 
Constitution, it was far from clear how the Brotherhood would go about establishing Islamic 
governance in Egypt. Perhaps, Brotherhood leaders decided that vagueness is a 
(conservative) pragmatic’s best friend in uncertain times, especially with the SCAF watching 
its every move.  
Therefore, Egypt’s Muslim Brothers, intentionally or not, elevated ambiguity to 
institutional heights over the decades. This ambiguity makes tracing an ideological 
“directionality” in the Brotherhood’s discourse a tough going. Definitely, the Brothers have 
come a long way since al-Banna’ in working within the existing framework of state. 
However, the Brothers have not succeeded in finalizing their ideological direction, leaving 
shari’a and man-made law, civil and religious identities, and people and God live together in 
unspecified and uncertain relationships. Pursuing its goal of political influence in state and 
society, the adoption of general discursive frameworks, which could be conveniently 
amended when needed, were always prioritized over detailed stipulations on fundamental 
issues. Perhaps, pragmatism, political ambition and ideological ambiguity were the very 
ingredients of revolt against the Brotherhood’s rule, by a people it did not understand to 
represent.  
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